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New Punitive Damages in Mexican Law – or the 
Chronicle of a Failed Legal Transplant Foretold? 
 
BY EDGARDO MUÑOZ1 AND RODOLFO VÁZQUEZ-CABELLO2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In February 2014, the Supreme Court of Mexico, referring to some 
American cases and scholarly articles, held that punitive damages must be 
awarded to a tort plaintiff as part of the indemnity afforded by Mexican law 
under the head of moral damages (daños morales).  Before this landmark 
decision, punitive damages were unknown to the Mexican legal system.  
The authors submit that the legal transplant carried out in Mexico has a few 
problems, which concern both the incorrect understanding of the adopted 
rule and the incompatibility of the host legal system.  As a consequence, 
punitive damages, as they stand now in Mexico, will not properly 
accomplish the function that punitive damages have in the United States, 
i.e., to effectively and fairly punish tortfeasors and dissuade potential ones, 
unless some post-transplant adjustment is implemented.  In order to 
demonstrate their hypothesis, the authors apply the functional method of 
comparative law and the theory of legal transplants, including the criteria 
developed by prominent comparatists, to determine the likelihood of 
success transplanting punitive damages in Mexico.  
 
Keywords: Mexico, Punitive Damages, Comparative Law, Legal 
Transplants, Functional Method. 
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1. Introduction 
On February 26, 2014, the Supreme Court of Mexico held that punitive 
damages must be awarded to a tort victim as part of the compensation 
afforded by Mexican law under the head of so-called moral damages 
(daños morales). 3   Before such a landmark decision, punitive damages 
were unknown to the Mexican legal system.4  Punitive damages, also called 
 
 3. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, Feb. 26, 2014, Amparo Directo 30/2013, 
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=15359
5. 
 4. Prior to the aforementioned decision, despite the statutory enactment of class 
actions in 2011 in Mexico, it is regrettable that the Federal Congress decided not to 
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exemplary damages, are part of the torts law in some common law 
jurisdictions, especially, in most states of the Unites States.5  Their purpose 
is to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous misconduct and to deter him and 
others from similar misconduct in the future.6  Under common law, they 
are non-compensatory damages in that they do not intend to compensate a 
plaintiff for the actual financial or emotional losses suffered due to the 
harm caused by the defendant.7  
Punitive damages have been subject to criticism in the United States 
and other common law jurisdictions, in particular, regarding the occurrence 
of large amount of indemnities granted in some cases,8 the view that it is 
anomalous when the plaintiff recovers a financial windfall, or that any 
award imposed by means of punishment should be paid to the State.9 In 
spite of such criticism, there are many benefits that this legal concept could 
bring to the Mexican society.  Punitive damages could help reduce the low 
 
incorporate punitive damages into Mexico’s legal framework or even in matters dealing 
with environmental law.  See Rodrigo González-Camarena, Punitive Damages and Their 
Alternatives in Mexican Environmental Law, 6 MEXICAN L. REV. 45, 47 (2013). 
 5. Punitive damages may be awarded in all States of the United States with some 
restrictions in Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington. 
Louisiana is a Civil Code jurisdiction that refused to recognize punitive damages, except as 
statutorily authorized. Nebraska and New Hampshire are common law jurisdictions that 
refused to adopt the remedy of punitive damages entirely. Massachusetts and Washington 
are common law jurisdictions that do not recognize punitive damages except as may be 
recovered under specific statutory authorization.  See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, Punitive 
Damages in the United States, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 
PERSPECTIVES, 155 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009). 
 6. Henry Brooke, A Brief Introduction: The Origins of Punitive Damages, PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES 1 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa 
Wilcox eds., 2009); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 394 (Pearson 
5th ed. 2008); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by Numbers: Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 18 S. CT. ECON. REV. 262 (2010), citing Exxon Shipping Co., 554 
U.S. at 481; Bradley Raboin, PUNISH THE CROWN, BUT PROTECT THE GOVERNMENT: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE TORT LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN ENGLAND AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE UNITED STATES, 24 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 262 (2016). 
 7. JASON TALIADOROS, THE ROOTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AT COMMON LAW: A LONGER 
HISTORY, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253 (2016); Hersch & Viscusi, id. at 262 (citing Exxon 
Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 482); Brooke,  id. at 1; COOTER & ULEN,  id. at 394; SEBOK, supra 
note 5, at 155. 
 8. Acknowledging criticism of punitive damages, see Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 
497. 
 9. These were part of the opinions expressed by opponents to exemplary damages 
during the Opinion Consultation carried out by the English Law Commission in 1995.  See 
Brooke, supra note 6, at 2.  See also Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal 
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 371 (2003). 
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safety standards that are at the origin of government corruption,10 corporate 
negligence11 and a social culture that worries little about the consequences 
of accidents to other people12 or the harm to the environment.13  
In light of their foreign origin, the suitability of the Mexican Supreme 
Court’s adoption of punitive damages must be analyzed under some 
methods of comparative law.  In particular, we use the functional method 
to determine whether punitive damages under the American legal system 
are even comparable to those that were just introduced into Mexico, and 
which ones fulfills their function better.14  We also frame our analysis 
within the theory of legal transplants, the metaphor that comparatists use to 
explain the movement of legal rules from one legal system to another.15  
We conclude that the legal transplant carried out in Mexico has a few 
problems that concern both the incorrect understanding of the adopted rule 
 
 10. We do not submit that punitive damages should be awarded against the State, but 
corruption has encouraged citizens and companies to breach safety regulations that led to 
accidents and damages to victims and that could have been detected by government agents. 
For example, wrongful construction of a building that gets the final occupational 
government permit through bribes.  
 11. In Mexico, negligence practices among corporations are frequent due to the 
possibility of operating without being detected by law enforcement agencies.  
 12. To some extent, one may say that such is a characteristic of Mexican culture. 
Mexican society gives to physical danger and death less importance than other cultures do. 
Mexican poet Octavio Paz once said that “[t]he Mexican ... is familiar with death, jokes 
about it, caresses it, sleeps with it, celebrates it. True, there is as much fear in his attitude as 
in that of others, but at least death is not hidden away: he looks at it face to face, with 
impatience, disdain or irony: If they are going to kill me tomorrow do it now.” OCTAVIO 
PAZ, EL LABERINTO DE LA SOLEDAD Y POSTADA 22 § 8 (Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1992). 
 13. In the United States, punitive damages are often considered by some scholars as a 
signal virtue of the American tort system and a necessary and unique mechanism to protect 
its citizenry, especially against the risk of corporate malfeasance.  See T. KOENIG & M. 
RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 69 ff (NYU Press 2003). 
 14. RALF MICHAELS, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 342 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
2006). 
 15. In Section 3 below we argue that irrespective of whether the Supreme Court of 
Mexico has created new law in contravention to its judicial role and the division of powers 
clause in the Mexican Constitution or whether it was simply uncovering old Mexican law by 
means of a new interpretation on the scope of moral damages, it has, as a matter of fact, 
imported into Mexican law a new legal institution of foreign origin, thus, performing a legal 
transplantation in the way Alan Watson explained it in its work Legal Transplants: An 
Approach To Comparative Law: legal transplants is the phenomenon of “moving of a 
rule…from one country to another.”  See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN 
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (U. of Ga. Press 1993). 
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and the incompatibility of the host legal system.  Punitive damages, as they 
stand now in Mexico, may not properly accomplish the function that 
punitive damages have in the United States, i.e., to effectively and fairly 
punish tortfeasors and dissuade potential ones,16 unless there is some post-
transplant adjustments.  
The Mexican Supreme Court’s decision is already a great step forward 
in this field, but regrettably insufficient.  The limited role of judicial 
precedents in Mexico, that is, the Court’s task to interpret the law only and 
the constitutional restriction to create new law,17 means that it would take 
many years before Courts in Mexico develop proper guidelines for the 
adequate and complete transplantation of punitive damages.  This article 
aims at contributing to the scholarly discussion on the correct 
understanding and adoption of punitive damages in Mexico. 
The following section summarizes the facts, procedural history, and 
rulings of the Supreme Court’s decision on February 26, 2014 that awarded 
punitive damages for the first time in Mexico.  Section Three discusses 
why the aforementioned decision amounts to a legal transplant irrespective 
of whether the Supreme Court intended to create a new law or simply to 
uncover old Mexican law by interpreting the scope of moral damages.  
Section Four reviews the criteria to determine the degree of success of a 
legal transplant.  Section Five highlights specific problems and forecasts 
the results of the transplantation of punitive damages in Mexico.  Section 
Six proposes some changes and adjustments to the Mexican punitive 
damages.  Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Supreme Court of Mexico’s Decision of Feb. 26, 2014 
A summary of the facts of this decision is essential to understand the 
types of tort claims that the Supreme Court of Mexico purported to address 
with the award of punitive damages.  A brief overview of the procedural 
history and rulings of this case will also allow the readers who are 
unfamiliar with Mexico’s legal system to understand the components of 
civil liability and indemnity of which the new punitive damages are now a 
part of.  
 
 16. Brooke, supra note 6, at 1; COOTER & ULEN supra note 6, at 394; Hersch & Viscusi, 
supra note 6, at 262, citing Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2615. 
 17. See Section 3 below. 
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2.1 The Facts 
In September 2010, the victim, a young man, traveled to the Mexican 
beach city of Acapulco to stay at the Mayan Palace Resort (the “Hotel”) 
and celebrate the Mexican Independence Day. 18  The victim and three of 
his friends were kayaking in the Hotel’s artificial lake, and their kayak 
capsized. 19   Unfortunately, an underwater water pump that had not 
received proper maintenance for years had caused the artificial lake to 
become electrified.20  Approximately twenty-five minutes passed before 
the Hotel staff could shut down the electricity to allow for the victim to be 
rescued from the water.21  The Hotel had no emergency protocols for this 
type of case.22   The lifeguards had to wait until the victim’s girlfriend and 
her companion were on shore to rescue the victim and his friends.23  Other 
guests at the hotel administered first aid to the victim.24  It took the staff 
some twenty minutes to take the victim to the Hotel clinic after being 
pulled out from the water.25  The Hotel had no ambulance, so it took extra 
forty minutes for an ambulance to finally pick up the victim. 26  
Unfortunately, by the time the ambulance finally took the victim to a 
hospital, he had no vital signs.27 
2.2 The First Instance and Appeallate Proceedings 
On February 21, 2011, the victim’s parents sued the Hotel before the 
Superior Tribunal of Mexico City, seeking compensation for moral 
damages pursuant to Article 1916 of the Mexico’s City Civil Code.28  The 
concept of moral damages is a specific type of injury to one’s self-esteem, 
affections, relationships, etcetera, and shares some similarities to the 
concept of pain and suffering under the common law system.  Like pain the 
suffereing, the indemnity for moral damages is also compensatory by 
 
 18. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 116. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 117. 
 22. Id. at 116. 
 23. Id. at 117. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. This provision has adopted Article 1916 of the Federal Civil Code that serves as a 
model for all other States Civil Codes.  The Federal Civil Code supplements various Federal 
laws, including the Code of Commerce that applies to all trade transactions in Mexico. 
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nature.29  On August 9, 2012, the Superior Tribunal of Justice of Mexico 
City awarded eight million Mexican pesos to the victim’s parents as moral 
damages.30  Both parties appealed and the matter was turned over to the 
Appeals Chamber of the Superior Tribunal of Justice of Mexico City.  The 
victim’s parents requested, among other things, to be compensated in 
addition to the moral damages of eight million Mexican pesos, to 
distinguish the indemnity granted for the actual physical loss from moral 
damages, as well as a revision of the criteria considered in calculating the 
moral damages.31  On the Hotel’s side, it argued that the trial court had 
infringed several evidence rules and that, in any event, the victim’s parents 
had not demonstrated that the Hotel had any duty to the victim nor had it 
breached any legal provision or duty of care applicable in the present 
case.32  In addition, the Hotel also requested a clearer distinction between 
actual physical loss and moral damages, and challenged the trial court’s 
calculation of the moral damages which was based on the victim’s “life 
expectations” and the money invested by his parents up to the time of his 
death.33  Finally, the Hotel argued that the trial court should have applied 
the law of the State of Guerrero34 where the tort conduct took place and 
thus, the amount of moral damages should not be higher than one-third the 
amount awarded for actual physical loss,35 or in the alternative, the amount 
of moral damages should be calculated pursuant to the rules on indemnity 
in the Federal Labor Law.36  
On November 28, 2012, the Appeals Chamber of the Superior Tribunal 
of Justice of Mexico City issued its decision, and reduced the amount of 
indemnity for moral damages to one million Mexican pesos.  The Appeals 
Chamber found that in spite of the high degree of liability proved against 
 
 29. See Section 5 below and JORGE A. VARGAS, MEXICAN LAW FOR THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER 411 (Carolina Academic Press 2009); Jorge A. Vargas, Moral Damages under the 
Civil Law of Mexico - Are These Damages Equivalent to U.S. Punitive Damages?, 35 U. OF 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 266 (2004). 
 30. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 2. 
 31. Id. at 16-17. 
 32. Id. at 18-21. 
 33. Id. at 22-24. 
 34. In particular, the Hotel referred to Article 1768 of the Civil Code of the State of 
Guerrero. 
 35. This conflict of laws argument was brought to the trial court, but the court did not 
address it in its decision. 
 36. In particular, Articles 500-502 of the Mexico Federal Labor Law stipulate some 
rules on the amount of compensation that employers are required to pay to employees for 
accidents that take place in the context and during their labor activities.  
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the Hotel, it was unreasonable to award an indemnity that was fifteen times 
the value of its share capital.  The Appeals Chamber also held that moral 
damages were not intended to compensate “life expectations” under 
Mexican law, which should not have been considered by the trial court in 
determining the amount of indemnity.37 
2.3 Constitutional Claims 
Unhappy with the Appeals Chamber’s decision, the victim’s parents 
filed an amparo directo suit to overturn it.38  More specifically, the victim’s 
parents sought a declaration that parts of Article 1916 of the Mexico City’s 
Civil Code were unconstitutional.39  The victim’s parents argued that the 
criterion of the “victim’s financial situation” set forth in such a provision to 
determine the amount of indemnity for moral damages infringed the 
constitutional rights of equal treatment and non-discrimination. 40   The 
victim’s parents contended that the relevant criterion to determine the 
amount of compensation was the actual loss actually caused to the 
intangible elements of moral damages such as feelings, beliefs, honor and 
physical appearance.41 
 
 37. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 29-30. 
 38. Amparo is a remedy for infringement of constitutional rights. There are two types: 
Amparo Directo and amparo indirecto.  The differences between the two concern 
procedures and jurisdiction.  The authority responsible in Amparo Directo suits is the 
Collegiate Circuit Court and, exceptionally, the Supreme Court of Justice. Amparo Directo 
may be brought to assert one person’s constitutional right to judiciary protection against a 
decision of any Mexican court at any level. In amparo indirecto, the suit starts at the district 
court level and the decision of the later may be revised by a Collegiate Circuit Court or the 
Supreme Court of Justice. Amparo indirecto regards the challenge of legislation and 
administrative decisions that affect the general population.  See STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., 
MEXICAN LAW 26667 (Oxford U. Press 2004). 
 39. Article 1916 of the Mexico City’s Civil Code reads: “El monto de la indemnización 
lo determinará el juez tomando en cuenta los derechos lesionados, el grado de 
responsabilidad, la situación económica del responsable, Y LA DE LA VÍCTIMA, así como las 
demás circunstancias del caso” (emphasis added).  We translate here as the following: “The 
amount of indemnity is to be determined by the judge taking into account the rights 
infringed, the degree of duty, the financial situation of the tortfeasor, AND OF THE VICTIM, as 
well as other circumstances of the case” (emphasis added).  
 40. As explained by the Supreme Court of Mexico in the decision at stake, the right to 
equal treatment and nondiscrimination is found in Article 1 of the Mexico Constitution, 
Articles 1 and 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Preamble and Article II 
of the Inter-American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Mann, and Articles 1.1 and 
24 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.  See Supreme Court of Mexico, 
First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 102. 
 41. Id. at 33-34. 
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The amparo directo claim was first registered in the First Circuit with 
the Second Collegiate Tribunal under docket number 30/2013.  However, 
in light of the importance of determining whether Article 1916 of the 
Mexico’s City Civil Code was discriminatory, considering that the victim’s 
financial situation should be taken into account for calculating the amount 
of indemnity, on March 1, 2013, the victim’s parents requested the 
Supreme Court of Mexico to exercise its certiorari power to decide the 
amparo directo claim.42  On March 29, 2013, the First Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of Mexico agreed to exercise its certiorari power to decide 
the case.43 
2.4 The Supreme Court’s Rulings 
The Supreme Court of Mexico started the ruling part of its decision by 
providing the legal framework where moral damages operate, as well as 
their definition.  On the former, the Court explained that moral damages 
are part of the compensation, together with actual physical losses, afforded 
for both contract and tort44 injuries.45  With regard to their definition, the 
Court refer to Article 1916 of the Mexico’s City Civil Code which states 
that “moral damages are any loss caused to a person’s feelings, affections, 
beliefs, decorum, honor, reputation, privacy, and other physical aspects or 
self-esteem”.46  Then, the Court explained that the notion of moral damages 
focuses on non-physical or spiritual interests that must be protected, 
including anguish, afflictions, humiliation, suffering, or psychological 
pain.47 
The Supreme Court of Mexico also explained that there are three 
subspecies of moral damages.  First there is the loss of honor, which 
includes damage to someone’s personal image and privacy.48 Second, there 
is the cosmetic loss, which reflects in the mortification of the victim as a 
 
 42. In Mexico, the writ of certiorari is known as facultad de atracción, whereby the 
Supreme Court may decide to review a lower court decision, in lieu of leaving a Collegiate 
Circuit Court with original jurisdiction to decide the Amparo Directo claims. This 
prerogative of the Supreme Court of Mexico is found in Article 107(v), last paragraph of the 
Mexico Constitution. 
 43. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 4. 
 44. In the words of the Supreme Court of Mexico as “the legal duty not to harm other.” 
Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 38 
 45. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 38-39. 
 46. Id. at 42. 
 47. Id. at 43. 
 48. Id. at 44. 
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consequence of harm to her own body.49   Third, there is the harm to 
feelings, causing affliction to the victim.50  
In addition, the Supreme Court developed that indemnity for moral 
damages redresses both the pecuniary consequences or loss that may be 
calculated with some certainty and the non-pecuniary consequence or loss 
that cannot be quantified with exactness but is certain that occurred. The 
first category includes missing revenues as a consequence of the slowdown 
of work activities caused by depression.51 The second category regards, for 
example, the misery caused by the breach of a transport contract that ruins 
the victim’s holiday or honeymoon.  The Court also confirmed that the 
indemnity granted for moral damages may cover both present and future 
losses,52 and that the right to moral damages is autonomous to the right to 
actual physical damages.53 
2.5 The Calculation of Indemnity For Moral Damages 
The Supreme Court of Mexico pointed out that the amount of 
indemnity to be granted by courts for moral damages was discretionary,54 
but subject to the criteria in Article 1916 of the Mexico City Civil Code55 
and the right to a “fair indemnity” in Article 1 of the Constitution of 
Mexico and other human rights treaties.56  With regard to criteria in Article 
1916 of the Mexico City Civil Code, the Court explained that in the 
calculation of moral damages, regard is to be had of the rights infringed, 
the degree of liability and financial situation of the tortfeasor, and the 
victim, and other surrounding circumstances of the case.  In relation to the 
criterion of financial situation of the victim, which was the basis of the 
victim’s parents amparo directo claim, the Court decided that it was 
unconstitutional to consider the economic situation of the victim in order to 
calculate the non-pecuniary consequences of moral damages, but 
constitutional to consider the economic situation of the victim in order to 
determine the amount of the pecuniary consequences of moral damages.57 
 
 49. Id. at 45. 
 50. Id. at 46. 
 51. Id. (citing RAMÓN D. PIZARRO, DAÑO MORAL. PREVENCIÓN. REPARACIÓN. PUNICIÓN. 
EL DAÑO MORAL EN LAS DIVERSAS RAMAS DEL DERECHO 35 (Hammurabi 2d ed. 2004)). 
 52. Id. at 47. 
 53. Id. at 47-49. 
 54. Id. at 92. 
 55. Id. at 93. 
 56. Id. at 85 ff. 
 57. Id. at 106-09, 112.  
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What came next in the Supreme Court’s decision was not part of the 
arguments raised by the victim’s parents, but an important holding by the 
Court which not only had effects on the amount of damages finally 
awarded in this specific case, but also in the scope of moral damages under 
Mexican law.  The Supreme Court held that, on the basis of the criterion of 
“degree of liability and financial situation of the tortfeasor” in Article 1916 
of the Mexico City Civil Code and the human rights principle of fair 
indemnity, punitive damages may be awarded by courts under the head of 
moral damages.  
In relation to Article 1916 of the Mexico City Civil Code, the Supreme 
Court of Mexico explained that the express mandate of this provision 
considers the degree of liability and financial situation of the tortfeasor in 
the calculation of moral damages, coupled with its legislative history, that 
treats damages not only as a means to redress any pain but also to punish 
the tortfeasor, should lead to a conclusion that the amount of indemnity 
awarded to compensate a victim’s losses shall be enough to redress such 
loss and to condemn the tortfeasor’s conduct.58  In particular, the Court 
considered that the statement “tort compensation does not only redress the 
victim and punish the tortfeasor” in the legislative records that led to the 
latest changes to Article 1916 on December 31, 1982, meant that the 
indemnity was not capped by the actual loss but that the amount may be 
affected by other aggravating elements, i.e., the tortfeasor’s conduct and 
his/her financial situation.59  However, it is worth noting that the Supreme 
Court used the phrase “compensate the damages caused to the victim,”60 
which is important for the analysis that we advance in Section Five below. 
With regard to the right to a fair compensation in Article 1 of Mexico’s 
Constitution and Article 63.1 of the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights, the Supreme Court of Mexico first cited the decision of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in Cantonal Benavides v. Peru, 
endorsing the view that the victim’s right to adequate compensation is, as a 
second facet, “sending a message of official disapproval for the violations 
of the human rights in question and the commitment that they will not 
happen again.” 61   Relying on this decision and the statement of the 
Argentinean scholar RAMÓN D. Pizarro, the Supreme Court of Mexico 
concluded that damages compensation is a social expression of disapproval 
 
 58. Id. at 89-91. 
 59. Id. at 89-91. 
 60. Id. at 91. 
 61. Id. at 86, n.121 (citing Cantoral Benavides vs. Perú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
88, ¶ 53 (Dec. 3, 2001). 
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of any legal wrong, and if punishment is not granted, the expressed 
disapproval practically disappears.62 
The Supreme Court of Mexico did not clarify whether punitive 
damages were to be awarded for the pecuniary consequences of moral 
damages or only for the non-pecuniary consequences of moral damages.  
We understand this as an oversight of the Court rather than a mistake in the 
ruling.  From the logic of this decision, we submit that punitive damages 
could only be part of the non-pecuniary consequences of moral damages 
since the amount of indemnity for the pecuniary consequences are limited 
to the spiritual loss that may be calculated with certainty, thus, its quantum 
may not be affected by other aggravating elements, such as the degree of 
liability or financial situation of the tortfeasor. 
As a consequence, the Supreme Court of Mexico awarded over 30 
million Mexican pesos in moral damages to the victim’s parents in light of 
the gross infringement of the victim’s rights, the high degree of liability, 
and financial situation of the defendant.63  It also redesigned the scope of 
civil liability (tort and contractual)64 by adding punitive damages under the 
head of moral damages as the diagram in Chart Number One (Mexico) 
summarizes at the bottom of this article. 
3. The Transplant of Punitive Damages Into Mexican Law 
In the February 2014 decision, the Supreme Court of Mexico was 
explicit about  the American origin of the punitive damage notion that it 
adopted.  The Court cited American scholars to explain the punitive and 
deterrent nature that the punitive award has on the defendant.65  It also 
referred to Pizarro to assert that “damages compensation is a social 
 
 62. Id. at 88, n.128 (citing PIZARRO, supra note 51, at 532). 
 63. Id. at 124. 
 64. Moral damages may also be granted in contract law claims under Mexican law, and 
the Supreme Court of Mexico did not limit the availability of punitive damages to tort 
claims. However, in Section 6 we submit that part of the changes in the adoption of punitive 
damages should be to limit their awards to tort law claims. 
 65. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87, 
nn.125-26. The Supreme Court of Mexico relied on the following American journal articles 
(somehow old for the case): David W. Owen, Punitive damages in products liability 
litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1279 (1976); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of 
Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705 (1988); Fred W. Morgan, The Evolution of Punitive 
Damages in Product Liability Litigation for Unprincipled Marketing Behavior, 8 J. OF PUB. 
POL’Y & MARKETING 279 (1989); Nanette A. O’Donnell, Punitive damages in Florida 
negligence cases: How much negligence is enough?, 24 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 803 (1988). 
 
2019] New Punitive Damages In Mexican Law 215 
expression of disapproval of any legal wrong, and if punishment is not 
granted, the expressed disapproval practically disappears.”66  However, in 
that instance, it is doubtful whether Pizarro was referring to punitive 
damages in the context of the common law legal systems or, rather, to a 
general effect that compensating the actual loss may have over a tortfeasor.  
In fact, Argentinean law does not recognize punitive damages. The draft 
bill for the new Argentinean Civil and Commercial Code, which entered 
into effect on August 1, 2014, contemplated the award of punitive damages 
in Article 1714.67  However, this proposal was rejected in its final bill.68  
The Anglo-American background of the punitive damages awarded by the 
Supreme Court of Mexico is also evidenced in the Concurrent Opinion 
issued along with the commented decision. 69   In Justice Cossío Diaz’ 
concurrent opinion, he recommended to look at American scholarship and 
cases from the Supreme Court of the United States to determine the just 
amount of punitive damages in relation to the actual physical damage 
awarded to a victim.70  
But why exactly did the Supreme Court of Mexico apply a common 
law legal institution for the first time as part of Mexican law?  This case 
had no relation or contacts with any foreign law or jurisdiction.  The the 
plaintiff in the amparo directo claim did not bring any theory regarding the 
relevance of punitive damages as part of the indemnity under a common 
law system that may be applicable to, for example, the holding company of 
the Hotel.  It was the Supreme Court of Mexico, on its own motion and 
pursuant to its iura novit curia power,71 that decided to award punitive 
damages in this case under Mexican law.  
 
 66. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 88, n.128 
(citing PIZARRO, supra note 51, at 532). 
 67. See Natalia Soledad Colarusso, Daños punitivos en el nuevo Código Civil y 
Comercial. La Inclusión Que No Fue § 2017 (Editorial Jurídica ed., UTSAPRA  2015), 
http://server1.utsupra.com/site1?ID=articulos_utsupra_02A00393369773. 
 68. See id.  
 69. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, Voto Concurrente (“Concurring Vote”) 
by Jusctice José Ramón Cossío Díaz, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 9-10, nn.5-7. 
 70. Id. The Concurrent Opinion made reference to Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Cleopatra Haslip Eta Al, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) and Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. 471 (2008), 
and cited Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and 
Rational?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. U. OF CHI. (1997). 
 71. Iura novit curia is a legal principle in most civil law jurisdictions, including 
Mexico, pursuant to which “the court knows the law”, i.e., that the parties to a legal dispute 
do not need to plead or prove the law that applies to their case. See Maria do Carmo 
Henríquez Salido, et al., El Principio Procesal Iura Novit Curia En La Jurisprudencia Del 
Tribunal Supremo, 64 REVISTA DE LLENGUA I DRET, J. LANGUAGE & L. 1, 3 (2015) (Spain). 
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For a common law jurist, what the Supreme Court of Mexico did was 
simply to expand the law on torts by adding punitive damages to the scope 
of indemnity afforded to victims under some circumstances.  In other 
words, a common law jurist, from his own perspective, could consider, and 
rightly so, that the Supreme Court of Mexico created new rules on tort 
damages.  The background of this view is that the law of torts in the United 
Kingdom and the United Sates has historically been considered a judge-
made law—or common law in its narrow sense. 72   Judge-made law is 
developed from judgments handed down in courts and is most often used to 
make decisions in areas that have not been legislated by the legislative 
branch. 73   Judge-made law can be both creation of new rules and 
interpretation of existing ones.74  The origins of the tort law particularly 
illustrates the creation of law by courts.  Tort law, as a part of the common 
law, evolved as a reflection of the customs and practices of the local 
communities in Anglo-Saxon and Norman regions that were upheld in the 
decisions made by the royal courts of England.75  
The origins of punitive damages, as part of tort law, are not different.  
Sir Henry Brooke reported that punitive damages made their appearance in 
England in the 1760s, during a series of cases in which “[i]ndividuals 
suffered wrongful interference with their liberty at the hands of public 
officials and, in the absence of a code, the English common law judges 
awarded non-compensatory damages – or told juries that they might award 
such damages—if the defendant’s behaviour seemed bad enough, without 
troubling too much to classify these damages under any particular 
heading.”76  Similar awards followed over the next 200 years and transited 
 
 72. Ronald W. Eades, Attempts To Federalize And Codify Tort Law, 36 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 1, 527-28 (2000). 
 73. William Minor Lile, Judge-Made Law, 15 VA. L. REV. 527-28, 530 (1929). 
 74. John Barker Waite, Judge-Made Law And The Education Of Lawyers, 30 A.B.A. J. 
253, 253 (1944).  
 75. During the early years of the development of tort law in the United Kingdom and 
the United States, it would have been hard to imagine it as anything other than decisions on 
a case-by-case basis.  In this regard, the ability of tort law to grow and change with the 
times arose by virtue of two important factors: tort law is court-created common law, and 
tort law is local law.  Tort law is not bound by lengthy, complex, unbending legislation, 
since courts could review cases and make decisions based upon concepts of justice.  As the 
tort rules developed, they could be reviewed, revised, overruled, and improved with each 
new case.  See Eades, supra note 72, at 1-2. 
 76. Brooke, supra note 6, at 1. One of those cases was Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 
489, 489 (1763), where Mr. Wilkes’s house was the subject of a search under a general 
warrant of arrest, and he brought an action of trespass against the official who executed the 
search. His counsel asked for “large and exemplary damages,” since trivial damages would 
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to the English colonies including the United States; not only in different 
types of intentional and unintentional tort cases including assault, false 
imprisonment, defamation, seduction, and malicious prosecution, but also 
in cases of trespass to lands, and eventually trespass to goods.  Finally, in 
1964, the House of Lords decided in Rookes v. Barnard that such damages 
were specifically identified as “punitive” or “exemplary.”77  
Contrary to the role of common law courts, Mexican courts have no 
power to create new rules but only to interpret the provisions of statutes.78  
Article 49 of Mexico’s Constitution establishes that the Federal 
Government is divided into three branches through which it exercises its 
powers: legislative, executive, and judicial.  The same provision states that 
two or more of these powers may not be performed by one individual 
person or corporation, nor may the legislative power alone be assigned to 
one individual.79  This division of powers clause means that the task to 
create or derogate the law is exclusively assigned to the legislative branch 
of the government80 and that the courts, through which the judicial branch 
exercises its own power,81 may not interfere in such a task.82  In addition, 
Article 94, paragraph 10, of Mexico’s Constitution explicitly states, “the 
law (which obviously means the Congress created law as the only form of 
law that may exist according to the division of powers clause in Article 49 
above) will set forth the criteria to determine the binding case law 
 
not put a stop to such proceedings.  Lord Chief Justice Pratt instructed the jury that 
“[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a 
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of 
the detestation of the jury to the action itself.” See Taliadoros, supra note 7, at 258. 
 77. Rookes v. Barnard, 1 All England Law Reports 367 (1967), cited in VANESSA 
WILCOX, Punitive Damages in England, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 
PERSPECTIVES 7 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009); see also Taliadoros, supra 
note 7, at 255. 
 78. ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 38, at 82.  
 79. Except in cases of war or national security where the Executive power through the 
President may temporality limit or suspend the rights and warranties of the population 
pursuant to Article 29 of the Mexico Constitution or when the Executive power legislates on 
import or export tariffs and taxes in order to govern international trade of goods and the 
national economy stability pursuant to Article 131 of the Mexico Constitution. 
 80. “Codification is thought to be consistent with democratic principles in that it 
assigns the task of creating law to legislators”, ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 83. 
 81. Article 94 states that the Federal Judicial Power is exercised through a Supreme 
Court, the Electoral Court, the Collegiate and Unitary Circuit Courts and the District Courts. 
 82. “Norms in a code have legal validity because they have been adopted by the 
legislature … In applying code provisions to specific cases, judges are to decide cases in 
accordance to the will of the legislature,” ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 82. 
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(‘jurisprudencia obligatoria’) issued by Federal Courts on the 
INTERPRETATION of the Constitution and general norms” (emphasis 
added).83  The principle that Courts may only interpret legislatively-enacted 
laws is also reinforced by the due process clause in Article 14 of Mexico’s 
Constitution that provides that “in any civil proceedings, the final decision 
shall be in accordance with the text or judicial INTERPRETATION of the 
law” (emphasis added).  In both cases, Mexico’s Constitution clearly 
addresses the interpretation rather than the creation of the law.84  This 
division of powers maxim has also been adopted by the local Constitutions 
of 32 Mexican states, which means that local state courts are also limited in 
their judicial roles to only interpret local laws.   
The above explains why the Supreme Court of Mexico could not have 
created a new law in the way common law courts have been doing for 
many centuries, with regard to tort law and punitive damages.  In its goal to 
redesign the compensation rules for victims in tort cases, the Supreme 
Court of Mexico had recently decided the unconstitutionality of some 
federal statutory provisions, which, for example, placed a cap on the 
compensation of damages. 85   But with regard to punitive damages, its 
seems that the Supreme Court of Mexico had no choice but to perform the 
transplantation of a foreign legal institution into a system of tort indemnity 
that has been, historically, compensatory in nature.  Did the Supreme Court 
of Mexico breach the separation of powers clause in Article 49 of Mexico’s 
Constitution with the application of punitive damages?  The answer may be 
no.  The Supreme Court did not incorporate punitive damages as a distinct 
type of damages, independent from compensatory damages.  The 
interpretative role of courts in many civil law jurisdictions forced the 
Supreme Court of Mexico to simply construe that punitive damages were 
part of the compensation afforded by the statutory law under the head of 
moral damages.  In Section Five of this article, we submit that this will 
represent a problem for the proper functioning of punitive damages in 
Mexico.  
 
 83. Id. at 84: “In a civil law country such as Mexico, the creation of binding judicial 
precedent, not being part of the legal tradition, must be established by legislation.” 
 84. Id. at 82: “Self-contained codes are expected to prevent judges and others from 
creating rules that would contradict the spirit of the code.” 
 85. See Supreme Court of Justice, First Chamber, Amparo Directo 1068/2011, Oct. 19, 
2011. In the case at hand, Article 62 of the Civil Aviation Law provides that the indemnity 
for the damages incurred by passengers may not be three times higher than what is 
stipulated in Articles 500-502 of the Mexico Federal Labor Law, which set the rules on the 
amount of compensation that employers are required to pay employees for accidents that 
take place in the context and during their labor activities. 
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In spite of the whether the Supreme Court’s move was too subtle to be 
considered the result of pure interpretation of statutory law rather than the 
breach of the division of power clause in Mexico’s Constitution, the result 
is the adoption a foreign legal notion into Mexico’s legal system.  
Scholarship has proposed different metaphors and concepts to describe and 
explain the effects of these adoption phenomena, the most known being 
legal transplants or transplantations.  Explained for the first time in 1974 by 
Alan Watson, in his work Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative 
Law,86 legal transplant is the phenomenon of “moving a rule... from one 
country to another.”87  In fact, this represents one of the most common 
means of legal change because legal actors tend to borrow what is needed 
from other legal systems to solve issues or fill gaps in the local legal 
system in a pursuit to create different or better laws.88  Watson compared 
legal transplants to the transplants of human organs, suggesting that a 
successful legal transplant will “become part of that body just as the rule or 
institution would have continued to develop in its parent system,” and grow 
in its new body.89  This medical metaphor of legal transplants refers to the 
surgical understanding of transplant and is the most common metaphor.90  
It compares the process of moving the law from one place to another to the 
search for a compatible donor so as to provide hope to other systems of the 
world community.91  Like a medical transplant, the success of the legal 
transplant depends on making the host system believe that the adopted rule 
already belonged to it.  In the same line of thought, a legal transplant may 
fail because of the incompatibility of the host legal system’s own condition 
with the inherent features of the rule received.92  
The metaphor of medical transplants has its own limits in explaining 
what actually happens when a rule is moved from one legal system to 
 
 86. Watson was not the first one to use the concept of legal transplant.  Legal historian 
Frederik Parker Walton, in his article “The Historical School of Jurisprudence and 
Transplantations of Law,” used the concept of “legal transplantation” in a critique to the 
then popular views of the historical school of jurisprudence.  Walton, like Watson but a half 
century later, pointed to the regularity of occurrences of transplantation of law.  See F. P. 
Walton, The Historical School of Jurisprudence and Transplantations of Law, 9 J. COMP. 
LEGIS. & INT’L L. 183, 183 (1927). 
 87. Id. at 21.  
 88. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.J. 1, 2 
(1974); BEATA KVIATEK, EXPLAINING LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: TRANSPLANTATION OF EU LAW 
INTO CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 31 (Wolf Legal Publishers 2015). 
 89. WATSON, supra note 15, at 27. 
 90. Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 5-6; KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 63. 
 91. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 63. 
 92. Id. 
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another.  As noted by one scholar, legal transplantations occurred not 
because of the contrasts between healthy and ailing legal systems, but 
because of the wider demand by some actors of a legal system that 
promotes change in their society.93  In this regard, some assert that different 
metaphors, such as the botanical one, may be more suitable than the 
medical metaphor to illustrate what Watson had in mind.  The transplants 
of plant species, for example, show that seeds may be planted and 
engrafted on foreign soil, where they wilt, vegetate or prosper.94  Hans W. 
Baade explains that a successfully transplanted crop flourishes in both the 
original and the new environment.95  Although there may be differences of 
color, size, or demand in the fruits of the transplanted seeds, the original 
land will still have its own crops, while the medical metaphor assumes that 
the donated organ is removed from the donor system.96  Besides, in the 
botanical metaphor, there is always space for the adaptation or alteration in 
the recipient system—for example by installing greenhouses over the 
recipient land to achieve the proper temperature or humidity for successful 
growth—whereas the medical metaphor suggests that the recipient body 
will not change in essence.97 
Other alternative concepts proposed to depict the legal transfer of 
one rule from one place to another.98  The proponents of these alternatives 
to explain the same legal phenomena often consider that the original notion 
of legal transplants is imperfect because of the lack of flexibility in 
assuming that the outcome of legal transplantation is either a success or a 
failure, and its static meaning as opposed to the dynamic concepts that they 
advance.99  Some see legal transplantation as the process of circulation of 
legal ideas because it refers to movement and continual flow of legal 
concepts and paradigms.100  Others focus on the transformations that legal 
 
 93. Id. at 64. 
 94. Id. (citing Hans W. Baade, Transplants of Laws and of Lawyers, JUSTICE IN 
PARTICULAR: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR P. J. KOZYRIS 2 (Phaedon J. Kozyris 
ed., 2007)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 64. 
 97. Id. at 65. 
 98. Alternative terminology includes collective colonization, legal irritants, layered-
law, hyphenated-law, and competition systems. Images such as contamination, inoculation, 
irritation, reception, imposed reception, concerted parallel development, and transposition.  
See Esin Örücü, Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 205, 207 (2002). 
 99. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 65.  
 100. Edward M. Wise, The Transplant of Legal Patterns, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1990). 
 
2019] New Punitive Damages In Mexican Law 221 
ideas undergo when adopting a rule into a different legal system,101 or on 
the irritation and unexpected events that are triggered when one foreign 
rule is imposed on a domestic legal culture. 102   Finally, some authors 
proposed to call it “legal diffusion,” because a lot of legal borrowing is 
voluntary,103 or legal transposition as it is used in music where each note 
takes the same relative place on the scales; the transposition is done to suit 
the particular instrument or voice range of the singer.104 
The references to the American law on punitive damages in the 
February 2014 decision and its two Concurrent Opinions, show that what 
the Supreme Court of Mexico did was to move a rule that exists in the 
United States legal system to the Mexican one.  We favor the idea that this 
move should be understood through the lenses of the botanical metaphor of 
legal transplants rather than the medical one.  The Supreme Court of 
Mexico’s intention was to plant the seeds of punitive damages into the 
Mexican soil, hoping to see them flourish there, just as they do in their 
original environment.  Since the beginning, however, there have been 
doubts about whether the Mexican legal system was the proper terrain for 
growth of punitive damages.  In the Concurrent Opinion issued by Justice 
Pardo Rebolledo, he asserts that if the Supreme Court of Mexico intended 
to import punitive damages from the United States, it needed to develop 
further its application parameters and distinguish them from the notion of 
“fair indemnity” because their goal is to punish rather than to 
compensate. 105   In this regard, the botanical metaphor suits this case 
because of the implied possibility to adapt the recipient system; as we 
anticipate should happen in Section Six, in light of the current problematic 
situation we describe in Section Five.  
With regard to the alternative metaphors, we consider them as useful 
supplements to the botanical metaphor of legal transplants.  At the end of 
the day, the Supreme Court of Mexico would not have come up with the 
idea of enlarging the scope of damages indemnity but for the circulation of 
 
 101. Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants To Legal Translations: The 
Globalization Of Plea Bargaining And The Americanization Thesis In Criminal Procedure, 
45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2004). 
 102. In other words, post-transplantation effects “unleash an evolutionary dynamic in 
which the external rules meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context will undergo 
fundamental change.”  See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or 
How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998). 
 103. KVIATEK, supra note 88, at 67. 
 104. Örücü, supra note 98, at 207.  
 105. Supreme Court of Mexico, Voto Concurrente by Justice Jorge Mario Pardo 
Rebolledo, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 4.  
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America legal ideas and paradigms that constantly flow from north to 
south.106  We also agree that the result of legal transplants is not necessarily 
a failure nor a success but that adoption of a legal institution undergoes a 
transformation and triggers different post-transplantation effects, some of 
which are more desirable than the others.  The insertion of the punitive 
damages into the Mexican legal system was voluntary.  One could even say 
that the Supreme Court of Mexico was aware of the fact that the Mexican 
legal system, as a musical instrument, did not have the same scale of notes 
to apply punitive damages as a distinct type of damages to the 
compensatory ones and still decided to transpose them.  Be that as it may, 
the legal transplant occurred because the Supreme Court of Mexico sought 
to implement changes in the law of damages that will as a consequence 
take the Mexican society toward a different direction.  The next step is to 
determine what the chances of success in the receptor system are.  In the 
next section, we revisit the criteria proposed by prominent comparativists 
to forecast the results of transplanted legal rules.  
4. The Criteria to Assess a Legal Transplant’s Effectiveness 
The simple act of borrowing a legal rule is a phenomenon with 
important social implications.  Alan Watson asserts that there are four 
aspects of legal transplants, which are important to explain why reception 
of foreign law happens.107  First, a jurist borrows a legal rule when such is 
economically efficient.  This aspect is called practical utility; which 
appeals to those who have the task of legislating law because of the hard 
labor of thinking that it saves.108  The second aspect is chance.  Watson 
suggests that the fact that a specific foreign rule is incorporated into a host 
 
 106. Geopolitical elements and economic integration have always played a role in 
Mexico’s adoption of legal institutions from the United States, in particular in the field of 
trade law. See Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 L. & POL’Y IN INT’L BUS. 391, 392 ff  
(1993).  Some private law legal institutions in Mexico, such as the trust (fideicomiso), came 
from the United States too.  The first Mexican Trust provisions were enacted in 1924 and 
followed closely the Uniform Fiduciaries Act enacted in the United States in 1922.  See 
CARLOS FELIPE DÁVALOS MEJÍA, TÍTULOS Y OPERACIONES DE CRÉDITO 541 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2012).  But the influence of United States Law is also clear in Mexican Constitutional 
Law.  See generally WATSON SMITH, Influences from the United States on the Mexican 
Constitution of 1824, 4 ARIZONA AND THE WEST (1962).  
 107. Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 355 (1996). 
 108. Id.; C. J. MILHAUPT & K. PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES 
REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 210 
(Univ. of Chi. Press 2008). 
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system responds to unexpected circumstances that make the materials or 
information about foreign law available at a particular time in the host 
system.109  The third aspect that leads to reception of the law is difficulty of 
clear sight or misunderstanding of the foreign legal institution which is 
adopted.110  This is similar to the aspect of chance; the foreign law is 
believed to be useful to the receptor system because it is highly regarded 
but its implementation is the result of a misunderstanding. 111   Finally, 
Watson explains that borrowing a rule from a foreign legal system often 
reflects the “need for authority” to justify the adoption of a solution that 
seems to be optimal for the host system.112 
Watson’s aspects of reception of law describe the motivations and 
circumstances that lead to borrowing a legal rule.  The adoption of punitive 
damages in Mexico may respond to similar circumstances.  The Supreme 
Court of Mexico referred to the American notion of punitive damages, 
which has developed its contours and purpose through legal scholarship 
and case law over the years.113  Its practical utility was thus an important 
aspect for the Court.  Chance also played its own role.  American legal 
materials and ideas were available to the Supreme Court Justices when 
drafting the decision.114  In addition, the transplant of punitive damages 
into Mexico may not have happened but for the difficulty of clear sight of 
the Supreme Court regarding the whole legal framework of damages 
indemnity in the common law.  Should the Court have had a clear 
understanding of the distinctive (punitive) nature that this type of damages 
has vis-à-vis compensatory damages, it may not have adopted them.115  
 
 109. Watson, supra note 107, at 340 (1996). 
 110. Id. at 341-45. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 345-49. 
 113. See Supreme Court of Mexico, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87, nn.13, and 125-
26; Voto Concurrente by Justice José Ramón Cossío Díaz, supra note 3, at 9-10, nn.5-7; 
Voto Concurrente by Justice Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, supra note 3, at 4. 
 114. The Supreme Court of Mexico had accessed to the following American journal 
articles (somehow old for the case): Owen, Punitive damages in products liability litigation, 
supra note 65; Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, supra note 65; Morgan, 
supra note 65, at, 279; and O’Donnell, supra note 65, at 803. See Supreme Court of Mexico, 
A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87, nn.125-26. Justice José Ramón Cossío Díaz had also 
cited to the following U.S. Supreme Court cases: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. 
Cleopatra Haslip Eta Al, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) and Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
See Voto Concurrente by Justice José Ramón Cossío Díaz, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 
13-14, nn.5-7.  
 115. Justice Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo was the only Justice from the Supreme Court 
of Mexico that suspected that there may be a misunderstanding about the function of 
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Finally, it was not a coincidence that the Supreme Court cited American 
scholars, as well as the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights,116 or a renowned civil law scholar such as Pizarro.117  The Supreme 
Court of Mexico’s choice of references reflects a need for authority, 
although we consider that in that case, the Court also misunderstood their 
real meaning (see Section 5.3 below).  
The motivation or reason for a legal transplant is important because it 
affects the conduct of the legal community that subsequently interprets and 
enforces the law and this in turn affects the effectiveness of the legal 
transplant in the long term.118  However, Watson’s aspects are insufficient 
to determine the extent to which the transplant of a foreign law may be 
successful.  Comparatists agree that legal transplants are not mechanical 
processes, and that there is a chance of rejection.119  In this regard, scholars 
have submitted that certain conditions are necessary for optimal legal 
transplantation.120  In this section, we revisit the criteria suggested by some 
leading works in this field.121  The purpose of this review is to frame our 
analysis about the forecasted results in the transplant of punitive damages 
into the Mexican legal system.  
Otto Kahn-Freund asserted that the merits of the imported law should 
not be evaluated in isolation; its impact on the broader legal system must 
be reviewed, including its institutional compatibility.122  He argues that 
since L’Esprit de Lois, 123  Montesquieu had already warned us that the 
private and public laws of each nation must be unique for the people for 
which they were created and, thus, it would be a great coincidence that the 
laws of one nation could also work for another.124  Under this view, legal 
 
punitive damages, which is different to the deterrence effect that compensatory damages 
could also have.  See Voto Concurrente by Justice Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, A.D. 
30/2013, supra note 3, at 4. 
 116. Supreme Court of Mexico, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 86, n.121 (citing Cantoral 
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transplants could only be successful if the geography, demography, 
ethnicity, economy, society and political system of the donor country were 
alike in the recipient country.125  He reckoned, however, that most of these 
elements, except for the political and social fit, have lost their importance 
as a key factor for successful transplantation.126  He submited that (already 
in the 1970s) industrialization, urbanization, and development of 
communications have greatly reduced the obstacles for transplantation, 
making the social, economic and environmental conditions more alike in 
most nations.127  What remains important for successful legal transplants is 
to establish compatibility between the host legal system and the socio-
political structure of the donor state.128  Accordingly, the degree to which a 
rule, say on tort liability, can be transplanted depends on “how closely is 
[the recipient system] linked with the foreign power structure.”129  The 
power structure may be “expressed in the distribution of formal 
constitutional functions or in the influence of those social groups which in 
each democratic state play a decisive role in the law making or decision 
making process.” 130   Kahn-Freund gives one interesting example that 
shows how variations in the organization of power between one country 
and another frustrate the transfer of legal institutions.  In the early 
nineteenth century Germany and France attempted to introduced the jury in 
civil proceedings but failed because the legal profession; both lawyers and 
judges, rejected it.131  It did not fit with the accustomed distribution of 
power between the courts and the bar; expressed in the inquisitorial trial 
style of these jurisdictions.132  One may argue that this example shows the 
importance of the legal culture fit rather than the compatibility with the 
power structure.  But Otto Kahn-Freund shows that in the past, similarly 
diverging rules have been adopted thanks to their acceptance by the power 
structure.  In particular, the mixed labor courts of of England, which solve 
disputes between employers and employees, came from France in 1964, 
and were accepted there irrespective of the royal courts’ tradition.133 
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In contrast, Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard suggest that a legal 
transplant is effective if there is demand for the adopted law in the host 
system.134  The adopted rule should be able to be used in practice and the 
legal actors responsible for developing the law need also to be responsive 
to this demand.135  Demand will usually take place where the legal actors in 
the host country are familiar with the basic legal principles of the 
transplanted law or adaptation to the local conditions occurs.136  Where 
these conditions are present the transplanted rule will function just as 
effectively as in its country of origin country.  However, when the host 
legal system does not share the same basic legal principles of, or its 
population is not familiar with the transplanted law, the demand for using it 
will be weak.137  Countries that receive the foreign legal concepts in this 
fashion suffer from the “transplant effect,” i.e. the mismatch between 
preexisting conditions and institutions and the transplanted law, which 
weakens its effectiveness.138  
In a different work, Milhaupt and Pistor challenge the assumption that 
legal transplants will fail if they do not fit with the culture of the recipient 
state.  Instead, they argue that demand for the transplanted law alone, and 
the process by which it is incorporated into the host country’s institutional 
structure is the key factor for determining how and whether the transplant 
will work.139  With regard to the need of demand in the transplantation of a 
protective legal rule [such as punitive damages] from a decentralized legal 
system [like the United States in the field of tort law claims]140 to a more 
centralized system [like Mexico],141 the relevant issue is whether there are 
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mechanisms in place to enforce the new rule.142  Do plaintiffs and lawyers 
have incentives to bring suits that make use of the new rule?  Are judges 
familiar with the underlying concept or doctrine?  Are they inclined to side 
with the normative implications of the legal change?  Demand sufficient to 
motivate this integrative activity by the local legal community is more 
likely to exist if the transplanted rule complements the political economy of 
the host country.143   Milhaupt and Pistor call this the complementarity 
between the transplant and the political economy “macro-fit.”  What is 
important is whether the foreign legal rule responds to an actual legal gap 
in the host country’s institutional structure that is not filled by other 
mechanisms and whether the rule is likely to be used.144  Accordingly, the 
effectiveness of legal transplants will vary depending on how well the new 
rules adapt to local circumstances.145  One of these adaptations is from the 
legal actors themselves: lawyers and judges must gain familiarity with the 
transplanted rule.  Further adaptation may involve removing procedural 
obstacles to its enforcement in the host legal system and, in general, create 
the proper environment and incentives for applying the new law.146  In 
conclusion, the existence of demand for the foreign rule also depends on 
the extent to which the changes are aligned with the conduct of local 
actors, including lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats in applying and 
enforcing the transplanted law.  
In addition, Esin Örücü stated that “tuning [of the transposed laws] that 
takes place after transposition by the appropriate actors of the recipient 
legal system is the key to success.”147  According to this author, voluntary 
transplants increase their own receptivity when adjustments are made to 
foreign legal rule.148  In this regard, the way in which a foreign rule is 
transplanted is a more important determinant of success than the source of 
supply and affinity of the systems involved. 149   For successful 
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transposition, tuning should be made by the host system and performed at 
all levels, including judges and legal educators. 150  Örücü also explained 
that fine-tuning should not necessarily result in likeliness; rather harmony 
is what is needed for successful transposition.151  The transfer of a legal 
rule and its reception will always be confronted by the idiosyncrasies of the 
legal community in the host system and face external resistance.  In fact, 
legal transplants can occurred between systems with socio-cultural and 
legal affinity, between systems with social and cultural similarity but legal 
cultural differences, and between systems that are both socio-culturally and 
legal culturally different. 152   In all these scenarios, successful 
transplantations may take time so that the local actors can fine-tune the 
foreign law.153  In some cases, such as in those systems that are socio 
and/or legal culturally alike, transposition can happen very smoothly with 
the help of fine-tuning, whereas other times, in particular but not 
necessarily between socio and legal culturally very different systems, 
transposition is the result of a strong push from a ruling elite or the legal 
profession.154  Örücü refers to Turkey as an example where transposition of 
law has been one between socio-culturally and legal-culturally diverse 
societies.  The modern Turkish private law is the result of transposing rules 
mainly from France, Germany and Switzerland. 155   Turkey reflects a 
sensitive tuning of law transposition in a country where some would claim 
dissimilar socio and legal cultures would prevent the transplant of the 
above-referred European laws. 156   One of the factors that facilitated 
transposition in this case was, however, the import of the complete legal 
structure and not just the isolated rules, which made the Turkish private 
law look very similar to the Swiss and German laws.157  In spite of this, 
successful transposition was only possible because the divergent and 
unintended consequences of the massive legal transplant that Turkey 
underwent since the beginning of the nineteenth century, has been adjusted, 
tuned, and homogenized over time.158  This was possible due to the support 
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of educational institutions, proactive judges, and creative scholars in a 
Muslim country where there are always fears that the social and cultural 
systems and the imported legal system will not easily agree.159 
5. The Forecasted Results of the Transplantation of Punitive Damages In 
Mexico 
We agree with the proposition that when a rule is borrowed from a 
foreign legal system, it becomes a different rule in the host legal system.  
The transplanted law inevitably is tropicalized by the local conditions, 
interpretation, and application by the local actors.  In this regard, 
measuring the results of a legal transplant under the criteria reviewed in the 
last section may be superfluous unless we determine, first, whether the 
foreign law is comparable to the adopted law itself.   To accomplish the 
determination of whether punitive damages under the American legal 
system are comparable to those just transplanted into Mexico, we will use 
the functional method in comparative law.  This methodology has many 
functions.160  One of them is to perform tertium comparationis: legal and 
non-legal rules, even doctrinally different ones, are comparable if they are 
functionally equivalent because they endeavor to accomplish or have the 
same function in their respective societies.161  
A different function of the functional method of comparative law is 
that functionality can serve as an evaluative criterion.  In that case, 
comparative law works as a criterion to determine which legal rule is 
better—American or Mexican punitive damages—because under the 
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functional method, “the better of several laws is that which fulfils its 
function better than the others.”162  
This section will be divided as follows.  In Subsection 5.1, we will 
perform a tertium comparationis between American and Mexican punitive 
damages in order to determine whether these are similar legal institutions 
and thus comparable ones.  In Subsection 5.2, we will assess how socio-
political differences of the receptor legal system, identified by Kahn-
Freund as an important factor for successful legal transplants, may affect 
the correct transplantation of the American notion of punitive damages in 
Mexico.  In Subsection 5.3, we will establish how much of Milhaupt and 
Pistor’s demand for the transplanted law there is in Mexican society and 
how well punitive damages have been incorporated into Mexico’s legal 
structure to meet such demand.  And finally in Subsection 5.4, we will 
evaluate whether Mexico’s punitive damages are as good as the American 
punitive damages in accomplishing their function in the Mexican and 
American societies, respectively.  
5.1 Assessing Comparability of Punitive Damages in the United States 
and Mexico 
Under the functional method of comparative law, two rules are 
comparable if they endeavor to accomplish or have the same function in 
their respective societies.163  The function of a rule is not defined by the 
intended purpose assigned by the legislature or the dogmatic reflections 
attached to it, but on the actual problem it endeavors to address or 
effectively tackles.164  The more specific the problem is, the less likely it is 
that there are rules in two or more systems whose function is the same.165  
But comparatists who do not find universality of a problem because of its 
high degree of specificity can always step down one level to compare those 
general needs shared by most societies from which the specific problem 
derives.166  For example, we may agree that most societies have the need to 
solve the problems (damages) caused by tortious conducts and that tort law 
is there to fulfil this need.  This is a universal problem.  But from there 
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other specific needs derive and, thus, rules may be in place to fulfil them.  
Tort law may be there to provide compensation for the harm suffered by 
victims of wrongful conducts in most societies, but some societies may 
have the additional need to send clear signals of deterrence to avoid similar 
conducts in the future. 
In addition, functional equivalents may not be known until they appear 
in the compared legal system.167  Late appearance may reflect a lack of 
problem or necessity to be solved in the past or a voluntary or negligent 
omission by the legal actors of the legal system concerned.  But the 
appearance of new rules allows the comparatist to identify the underlying 
problem and to recognize their function.  Still, how do we know that the 
function of damages indemnity is to deter wrongdoings or to punish, and 
not to compensate or to effectuate certain societal values, or all of the 
above?168   At the end of the day, “similarity of results to certain fact 
situation, regardless of the difference in doctrine, strongly suggest that the 
respective legal institutions can be different (but functionally equivalent) 
responses to a similar problem.”169 
In light of the above, let us turn to the functions that punitive 
damages seek to accomplish in the American legal system.  Owen, the 
same scholar cited by the Supreme Court of Mexico when it first 
introduced the concept of punitive damages in its decision,170 noted that 
most courts in the United States refer to “punishment” and “deterrence” as 
rationales for such damages. 171   In addition, Section 908(1) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts of 1979 states: “Punitive damages are 
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a 
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and 
others like him from similar conduct in the future.” 
In this line of thought, we may assert that the award of punitive 
damages serves the priority function of punishing tortious conducts.  That 
function is difficult to understand since a modern legal system should not 
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be based on private revenge.  However, punishment serves two sub-
functions that are easier to contextualize in modern societies, one of which 
is retribution.  As Owen explains, “[it] is entirely appropriate for the law to 
allow a person injured by the wanton misconduct of another to vent his 
outrage by extracting from the wrongdoer a judicial fine.”172  In this case, 
the function of punitive damages serves the protection of societal values of 
freedom and equality.173  As in the crime of theft, punishment in tort claims 
serves to restore the equality of the victim in relation to the tortfeasor by 
diminishing the extra worth and freedom held illicitly by the latter that was 
stolen from the victim.174  The other sub-function derived from punishment 
is law enforcement.  As we mentioned before, punitive damages are often 
criticized because the plaintiff receives more windfall than the 
compensation to her actual loss (see Section One above).  However, this 
criticism ignores that the very possibility of a windfall motivates victims 
who are reluctant to bring their claims against big corporations and 
therefore assists in enforcing the rules of law.175  Accordingly, the profits 
from punishment have a vital procedural function of law enforcement that 
is the basis for achieving other functions.176  
In addition, punitive damages in the United States serve the function of 
avoiding future damages by deterring the tortfeasor and anyone under 
similar circumstances from behaving in similar fashion. 177   But this 
function only works well in deterring gross misconduct when the law 
enforcers regularly catch and punish those that flagrantly infringe the rights 
of the other, and when potential offenders understand that the law censures 
and punishes their contemplated misbehavior. 178   Although it may be 
common knowledge that misconduct often goes undetected and 
unpunished, punitive damages serve to deter similar conduct by 
sensationalizing and making public the apprehension and punishment of 
tortfeasors.179  This, in turn, serves the sub-function of in educating the 
offenders and the society in general because it confirms the existence of 
legally protected rights and interests belong to the plaintiff and the 
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corresponding condemnation that society attaches to its flagrant invitation 
by the kind of gross misconduct of the defendant. 180  Since punitive 
damages express society’s disapproval of a conduct, we may say that 
punitive damages serve the function of effectuating the societal value of 
maintaining moral and legal standards of conduct.181  
Let us turn to the functions that punitive damages have or endeavor to 
accomplish in Mexico’s legal system.  First, we must acknowledge that it 
has been four years since the Supreme Court of Mexico’ decision, there 
have been neither cases reported from other Mexican courts, nor 
scholarship that may contribute to the understanding of punitive damages 
in Mexico.182  All that has been stated, mainly by lawyers in the form of 
law firm notes or bulletins, is that the Supreme Court of Mexico awarded 
punitive damages for the first time in February 2014, changing the legal 
landscape for companies and victims in Mexico.183  That being said, there 
are elements in the February 26, 2014 decision that can help us establish 
the functions that punitive damages pursue in Mexico.  In particular, the 
Supreme Court of Mexico expressly stated that punitive damages had the 
function of punishing and deterring the defendant and others in general 
from similar tortious conduct.184  The reference to American scholars in 
that specific passage of the decision confirms that that the Supreme Court 
of Mexico had in mind a similar understanding of the function that punitive 
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damages play in the United States.185  In addition, the Supreme Court also 
stated that punitive damages were part of the right to adequate 
compensation under the Mexican Constitution and the Inter-American 
Convention of Human Rights.186  Although it mixed concepts pertaining to 
different legal traditions, the Supreme Court of Mexico concluded that “the 
amount of indemnity shall accomplish its purpose to compensate but also 
to dissuade”187 giving to moral damages.  This is for the purpose of not 
only the function of deterring, but also of compensating.  Despite the clear 
line drawn between compensatory damages and punitive damages in the 
United States, some scholars have agreed that punitive damages may also 
serve the incidental function of compensating the victim.188 
Moreover, the facts that led to this case are descriptive of the type of 
gross misconducts that punitive damages also address and discourage in the 
United States.  The Hotel in the Mexican case was grossly negligent in 
providing first aid to the victim, since it did not have the emergency 
protocols required and it breached the law by failing to maintain the 
artificial lake’s equipment in proper conditions. Its careless conduct not 
only prevented the victim from receiving medical care in time, but also 
caused mortification to the victim’s friends and family, and hid crucial 
information about the victim’s death (see Subsection 2.1 above).  Punitive 
damages have been awarded against other hotels in the United States for 
gross misconduct that led to less severe injuries.189  Defendants who failed 
 
 185. Id.  The Supreme Court of Mexico relied on the following American journal articles 
(somehow old for the case): Owen, supra note 65; Morgan, supra note 61, at 279; and 
O'Donnell, supra note 61. 
 186. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 87-88. 
 187. Id. at 100. 
 188. Owen, supra note 65, at 378-79. 
 189. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 1199 (7th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003): 
In 2000, defendant’s clerks began issuing refunds to customers who complained about ticks 
and biting bugs in hotel rooms.  The hotel’s manager then recommended closing the 
establishment while every room was sprayed, but a supervisor refused. The hotel continued 
to rent out rooms and moved guests who complained. Judge Posner who decided the appeal 
of this case wrote of one guests who was moved to three rooms to get away from bedbugs. 
With the problem reaching “farcical proportions,” the hotel desk clerks were told to call the 
bedbugs “ticks” on the theory that customers would be less alarmed, as Judge Posner noted. 
Judge Posner also noted that the hotel put rooms on “Do not rent, bugs in room” status but 
then rented them anyway. Two guests brought a suit alleging wanton and willful conduct, 
and asked for compensatory and punitive damages. The defendant hotel claimed that its 
conduct was, at most, negligent, and that punitive damages were not warranted. The jury 
awarded compensatory damages of approximately $5,000 and punitive damages of 
$186,000 per plaintiff. 
 
2019] New Punitive Damages In Mexican Law 235 
to test the safety of their products and comply with all applicable standards 
and regulations, evincing a lack of care or indifference as to the safety of 
its customers have also been condemned with punitive damages in the 
United States.190 
In light of the above, the punitive damages transplanted in Mexico are 
comparable (yet still undeveloped) to those applied in the United States.  
Despite the dogmatic mistake that the Supreme Court of Mexico 
committed by considering punitive damages as part of moral damages, 
which nature is compensatory (see Subsection 5.3 below), the functions 
that they intend to serve are similar.  We should now determine how well 
punitive damages will function in Mexico. 
5.2 Socio-political Differences of the Receptor Legal System as an 
Obstacle for Successful Transplantation 
Kahn-Freund suggests that a legal transplant increases its chances of 
success if the socio-political structure of the donor state and the host 
system are compatible (see Section Four above).191  Under this view, the 
degree of acceptance of punitive damages depends on how closely 
connected the power structures of Mexico and the United States are.192  The 
power structure may be “expressed in the distribution of formal 
constitutional functions or in the influence of those social groups which in 
each democratic state play a decisive role in the law making or decision 
making process.”193  Against this background, the transplant of punitive 
damages in Mexico will not succeed unless the Supreme Court gets the 
firm support of the federal and state legislatures.  In spite of the act that the 
Supreme Court of Mexico has been trying to modernize the law on 
damages, Mexico is a civil law jurisdiction where the exclusive power to 
create the law is constitutionally allocated to the legislative branch.  This 
differs from the basic power structure in the United States where courts are 
empowered to create new rules on tort matters unless prevented by 
legislation (see Section 3 above).  Now that punitive damages are part of 
 
 190. See e.g., Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc., Case No. SJC 11294 (MA Sup. Jud. Ct. Sep. 
13, 2013): A young woman fractured two cervical vertebrae when she slid her head first 
down a defectively inflatable swimming pool, and stuck her head against the concrete deck 
of the pool when the bottom of the slide collapsed.  The jury found that the seller Toys “R” 
Us liable for negligence, breach of warranty, and wrongful death, and awarded 
compensatory damages in the amount of $2,640,000.  The jury also found Toys “R” Us 
grossly negligent and awarded punitive damages in the amount of $18,000,000. 
 191. Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 27. 
 192. Id. at 18. 
 193. Id.  
 
236 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
the indemnity afforded under the head of moral damages, the support of the 
legislative branch may come in two forms.  First, the federal and state 
legislatures may back up the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Mexico 
from any pressure by lobby groups demanding the enactment of legislation 
to reverse the Court’s ruling.194  Second, the Federal and State legislatures 
may enact better designed rules on punitive damages following the 
conclusions of comparative law studies like this one (see Subsection 5.3 
below). 
In addition, other legal actors in Mexico’s power structure must also 
support the ruling of the Supreme Court of Mexico.  It is worth noting that 
the interpretation of Article of the 1916 Mexico City Civil Code is not yet a 
binding precedent.  To require other courts to follow its decision, the 
Supreme Court of Mexico should have decided the matter in a plenary 
session or resolved the issue having as background two contradictory 
rulings from its own Chambers or other Collegiate Circuit Courts.195   The 
same principle applies at the state level.  But the interpretation of Article 
1916 could quickly become binding precedent if judges, including those in 
the Supreme Court of Mexico and Circuit Courts, consistently apply, 
interpret, or rule on the award of punitive damages in a series of five future 
cases, without interruption by any contradictory rulings.196   For this to 
continue happening, lawyers must also cite the February 26, 2014 decision 
as a persuasive authority before other courts.  Although it is difficult to 
establish binding precedents under the Mexican legal system, practice 
 
 194. This already has occurred for better in some private law matters.  For example, in 
2011 the Federal Congress added  Article 1464(V), Code of Commerce (Arbitration Statute), 
in order to repeal the decision of the Supreme Court of Mexico (Contradiction 51/2005, 
First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Mexico, 11 January 2006) whereby the challenge of 
arbitration agreements would fall within the purview of courts.  The enactment of Article 
1464(V) of the Code of Commerce in 2011 endorsed the principle of competence-
competence of arbitral tribunals making clear that “all challenges—be it solely to arbitration 
agreements or contracts as a whole—are encompassed by the duty upon courts to refer to 
arbitration, and hence are within the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.”  See FRANCISCO 
GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, Amendments to the Mexican Arbitration Statute, 1 INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BRIEF 6 (2011). 
 195. See ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 84.  The decision on February 26, 2014 was 
rendered by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Mexico.  
 196. Before, there were five constant and consecutive judgments on a point of law, the 
individual decisions are called tesis aisladas.  See id. at 85.  Currently, there is a more 
recent Supreme Court of Mexico’s decision where it stated that punitive damages are part of 
moral damages, nevertheless they were not awarded in that case.  See Supreme Court of 
Mexico, A.D. 593/2015, supra note 182, at 70, ¶ 140. 
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shows that lower courts routinely adopt, follow, and consider themselves 
bound by prior judicial rulings.197 
Accordingly, in order for the transplant of punitive damages to succeed 
in Mexico, members of its power structure such as legislators, judges, 
lawyers, and academics must promote their proper development and 
application in Mexico. 
5.3 Establishing the Demand for Punitive Damages In Mexico 
As previously mentioned, demand for the transplanted law and the way 
it is incorporated in the host country’s institutional structure are also key 
factors for successful legal transplants (see Section Four above). 198  
Punitive damages will respond to an actual need (demand to fill a legal 
gap),199 to raise the safety standards in jobs, goods, services, and everyday 
activities with rules that will encourage citizens to help promote the 
mechanisms of justice and deter those usually undetected tortfeasors in 
Mexico.200  There are no similar rules in place that are likely to be used to 
fulfill this demand.  In part, this is due to the fact that Mexico is a 
centralized system that typically vests law-making powers in the legislative 
or the executive branch and that has historically favored centralized law 
enforcement mechanisms.  The Mexican legal system reflects a rather 
paternalistic society where government agencies are expected to intervene 
when necessary to protect those who have been injured or disadvantaged 
by others.201  For example, if a tragedy happens because of an oil leak in 
railway accident, the tort case is often settled out of court with the 
responsible party or its insurer paying moderate compensation upon the 
intervention of the state or federal government agencies.202  This, in turn, 
highlights an important difference in the institutional structure of Mexico 
vis-à-vis the United States that may impact the actual demand for punitive 
damages.  The United States is a decentralized system where law making 
and law enforcement activities are allocated to multiple agents, including 
 
 197. Id. at 83. 
 198. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 208 (stating “that the nature of legal 
demand for the transplanted law and the process by which it is incorporated into the host 
country's institutional structure significantly affect whether and how the transplant will 
function”). 
 199. Id. at 210. 
 200. Keith E. Maskus et al., Implications of Changes in Labor Standards: A 
Computational Analysis for Mexico, 6 N. AM. J. ECON. & FIN. 172 (1995) (describing how 
weak is the enforcement of occupational safety and health standards in Mexico). 
 201. ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 38, at 521.  
 202. Id.  
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private parties who may exercise extensive rights to initiate law 
enforcement.  The United States legal system reflects a society that prizes 
individualism because citizens are encouraged to use self-help methods to 
preserve their rights to be free of interference and injury from others.203 
But part of the reason why Mexicans do not rush to file lawsuits and 
are less confrontational in tort matters, is also the old limitations on the 
amount of damages that were recoverable in personal injury actions.  The 
February 26, 2014 decision is an important signal of a new mechanism that 
may change Mexico’s institutional structure towards a less centralized 
system, at least in civil justice.  Now we may assert that plaintiffs and 
lawyers have incentives to bring suits under new rules and that judges will 
eventually become familiar with the concept or doctrine underlying them.  
Although there are no in-depth studies about the incorporation of punitive 
damages into Mexico’s legal system yet, which makes punitive damages 
look like a sleeping giant, the notes and briefs that have been published by 
lawyers reflect that they side with the normative implications of the legal 
change.204  In sum, there appears to be a sufficient demand to motivate 
integration of punitive damages in the political economy of Mexico.205  
While Mexico is a centralized legal system, Mexico’s economic expansion 
also promotes and requires the adoption of foreign rules that endorse the 
rights of citizens in an open economy.206 
That being said, there are a few mismatches with the preexisting 
conditions and legal institutions of the United States, that we anticipate 
may weaken the demand and, thus, effectiveness of punitive damages in 
Mexico, making the latter suffer a “transplant effect.” 207   The first 
mismatch is a dogmatic one, with practical consequences.  The common 
law legal tradition regards punitive damages as a type of damages that does 
not have a compensatory nature. 208   As commented above, their main 
function is to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous misconduct and to deter 
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 204. See e.g., Alejandro Osuna Gonzalez, supra note 183; Salvador Fonseca-Gonzalez & 
Antonio Curiel Valtierra, supra note 183; Armando Quintana Freg, supra note 183. 
 205. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 210. 
 206. John S. Wilson & Tsunehiro Otsuki, Food Safety and Trade: Winners and Losers in 
a Non-Harmonized World, 18 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 282 (2003); Mark M. Hager, Yankee 
Come Back? Occupational Safety and Health Reform in Mexico, 32 U. OF MIAMI INTE-AM. 
L. REV. 222 et seq. (2001). 
 207. Berkowitz et al., supra note 121, at 171. 
 208. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. 2605, at 2620-21, n.8, and 2623. 
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it and others from similar misbehavior in the future.209  This distinguishes 
punitive damages from the other types of damages that have a 
compensatory nature, i.e., those that aim at compensating for any actual 
loss.  In the United States, compensatory damages also include losses that 
are difficult to quantify in monetary terms but necessary to compensate for 
the actual harm caused, such as damages based on loss of companionship, 
and pain and suffering, which are equivalent to what were considered as 
the moral damages (non-pecuniary consequences) in Mexico before the 
addition of punitive damages to the equation.210 
Chart Number Two (United States) at the end of this article shows the 
basic classification of tort damages in the United States. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Mexico conceived punitive 
damages as part of moral damages.211  The nature of moral damages under 
Mexican law and all civil law systems is compensatory.212  Moral damages 
seek to place the victim or the injured party in the position it would have 
been in had the tort conduct never taken place, but also allowed, at the 
victim’s choice, the compensation of loss of profits. 213   This type of 
damages regards non-physical or spiritual harm related to a person’s 
emotional state of mind or social perception and includes, in the words of 
the Supreme Court of Mexico, loss of honor (reputation), harm to 
appearance (aesthetic), and harm to feelings.214  It aims to redress the actual 
nonphysical or emotional harm by means of compensation, whose amount 
must place the victim, to the extent possible, in the position it had before 
 
 209. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (Canada); Kuddus (AP) v. Chief 
Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2002] 2 A.C. 122 (H.L. 2001) (England). 
 210. VARGAS, MEXICAN LAW FOR THE AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 29; Vargas, Moral 
Damages under the Civil Law of Mexico -  Are These Damages Equivalent to U.S. Punitive 
Damages?, supra note 29.  
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new head of damages separated from compensatory damages.  Its only option was, thus, to 
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liability for tort conduct and breach of contracts. 
 212. Vargas, Moral Damages under the Civil Law of Mexico - Are These Damages 
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 213. Article 1915 of the Mexico Federal Civil Code. 
 214. Supreme Court of Mexico, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 44-45. 
 
240 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
the tort.215  Moral damages encompass the pecuniary consequences that 
may be calculated with some certainty, such as the expenses of 
psychological or psychiatric therapies, as well as the non-pecuniary 
consequence or loss that cannot be quantified with certainty but is certain 
that occurred, for example, the harm caused by affliction or sadness.216  
The Supreme Court of Mexico “interpreted” moral damages to include 
punitive damages to redress their non-pecuniary consequences (see 
Subsection 2.4 above). 
If we compare Chart Number One (Mexico) and Chart Number Two 
(United States), we see a clear mismatch in the nature of punitive damages 
in the United States and in Mexico.  The Supreme Court of Mexico 
incorporated a foreign institution into Mexico’s legal system that does not 
match the place and nature that the institution has in its legal origin.  The 
Province of Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction with regard to its private law 
background,217 is well aware of the dogmatic difference between punitive 
damages and moral damages. Article 1621 of the Quebec’s Civil Code 
explicitly allows for punitive damages to be awarded where it is permitted 
by law and states a non-exhaustive list of criteria to be considered when 
evaluating the amount.218  But Article 1611 of the Quebec’s Civil Code 
distinguishes them from moral damages (préjudice moral in French) that 
are part of compensatory damages. 
We admit, however, that the relevant question is whether, under the 
functional method of comparative law, punitive damages in the “Mexican 
style” are “as good of a law as” punitive damages in the United States, 
irrespective of the dogmatic difference mentioned above.  As we discuss in 
Subsection 5.4 below, the function of punitive damages will not be equally 
achieved in Mexico, since their compensatory nature will affect the method 
 
 215. The Supreme Court of Mexico recognized the compensatory nature of moral 
damages in its own decision when stating “[a]sí, puede afirmarse que el régimen de 
ponderación del QUANTUM COMPENSATORIO depende de la conceptualización del derecho a 
una justa indemnización, de la visión que nuestra tradición jurídica adopta de la 
responsabilidad civil y, en particular, del deber de mitigar los efectos derivados del daño 
moral [emphasis added],” Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra 
note 3, at 93. 
 216. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at 91-93. 
 217. Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction with regard to the law of property and civil rights 
only.  The criminal law, public law, or any subject which belongs to federal government is 
influenced by the laws of England.  See F. P. Walton, The Legal System of Quebec, 13 
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (1913). 
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Quebec revised its civil code to include punitive damages.  See John Y. Gotanda, Punitive 
Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 46 (2003). 
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of calculating their amount and, as a consequence, their deterrence 
function. 
A different mismatch is perceived at the procedural law level.  Tort law 
in the United States is closely linked to the procedural tools that plaintiffs 
enjoy to redress their private rights.219  There are two features of law of 
civil proceedings in the United States absent in the Mexican legal system 
that may upset the demand of punitive damages in Mexico: the procedural 
right to discovery220 and the right to jury trials.221  In the next subsection, 
we explain how the absence of these features of the law of civil 
proceedings in the United States may impair the proper functioning of 
punitive damages in Mexico. 
5.4 How Good Law Are Current Punitive Damages In Mexico 
Compared to Those From the United States  
As mentioned above, one of the functions of the functional method of 
comparative law is to serve as a yardstick to determine the “better law.”  In 
order to determine the “better law,” one must work under assumptions or 
hypothesis that one rule accomplishes its function better than another.222  
For example, in two rules that are comparable because they endeavor to 
have the function, the better law may be the one that, after evaluation, has a 
better doctrinal formulation and/or has showed better empirical results.223  
In this regard, a relative difference may determine superiority.  But it is 
worth noting that any evaluation of functional equivalent rules is only valid 
with regard to the function scrutinized.  One legal rule is not better than 
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another in absolute terms, at best it may be better regarding a certain 
function.224 
In the above sub-sections, we anticipated a few differences that may 
disadvantage Mexican punitive damages vis-à-vis their American 
counterpart.  In this subsection, we will focus on the doctrinal construction 
of Mexican punitive damages as part of so-called moral damages.  The 
differences at the level of procedural law will also be briefly addressed.  
Four years have passed since the single known Supreme Court case where 
punitive damages were awarded in Mexico.225   Still, it is too early to 
provide an empirical analysis of the role that punitive damages have played 
in deterring gross misconducts in Mexico.  However, we trust that this first 
theoretical evaluation will be the start for further empirical or theoretical 
analysis.  
Mexican law considers moral damages as a type of indemnity aimed at 
compensating the victim in a tort case (see Subsection 2.4 above).  
However, the Supreme Court of Mexico considered that pursuant to the 
legislative history of article 1916 Mexico City Civil Code, the right to a 
fair indemnity in Article 1 Mexico Constitution and Article 63.1 of the 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, moral damages may 
encompass punitive damages which purport to punish the tortfeasor and to 
deter him and others from similar conduct (see Subsection 2.5 above).  
This construction of moral damages will influence the method of 
calculating punitive damages.  If the Mexican judge is required to calculate 
an indemnity that at the same time that it deters, it also complies with the 
principle of full compensation, which in turn means granting no less and no 
more than the non-physical harm ensued (see Chart Number One, Mexico), 
the result cannot be an indemnity based on a rational correlation between 
compensatory damages and the percentage of harm cases that could go 
undetected 226 . The result cannot be an indemnity based on a rational 
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 225. Referring to the February 26, 2014 decision by the Supreme Court of Mexico, First 
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 226. See Supreme Court of Justice, 19 October 2011, Amparo Directo en Revisión 
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correlation between compensatory damages and the percentage of harm 
cases that could go undetected.227  
Indeed, the economic analysis of punitive damages in the United States 
suggests that these type of damages should be imposed only upon 
defendants who would otherwise escape liability through undetected 
tortious conduct.228  If the tort system were perfect in detecting every single 
wrongful conduct that happens in a jurisdiction, there would be no reason 
for punitive damages because compensatory damages in the aggregate 
would compensate and also deter.229  This premise results in a formula for 
calculating punitive damages whereby their amount should equal to the 
harm multiplied by the reciprocal of the defendant’s chance of being found 
liable for wrongful activities.230  Punitive damages so calculated would 
achieve their function of deterrence because they would cause defendants 
to internalize the full cost of all undetected wrongful activities.231  Some 
critics of this standard formula argued that it fails to take into account other 
important variables in the tort and litigation system; they suggested that the 
standard formula should be completed with analysis of important factors 
affecting litigation behavior and valuation, for example, settlement. 232  
Others said that more punishment can lead to less deterrence because, 
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although firms might increase safety expenditures to reduce expected 
liabilities, they might also reduce the amount of wealth or capital they 
expose to those liabilities.233 
Be that as it may, the key point in the economic analysis is that the 
defendant must pay an indemnity in excess of the compensatory damages 
equal to the amount of the harm that it caused for which it would not 
otherwise pay.  In this regard, considering the cases that go undetected in 
the calculation of punitive damages entails admitting evidence of 
presupposed harm that is unrelated to the actual physical and non-physical 
harm effectively caused to the victim.  This possibility would infringe the 
principle of compensatory damages under Mexican law because the victim 
would be overcompensated beyond her actual loss.234  
In spite of the above, the practice of juries and judges in the United 
States does not reflect a constant application of the calculation method 
described above. 235   Adjudicators have discretion in determining the 
amount of punitive damages insofar as their verdict complies with the “due 
process clause” in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
Sates Constitution.236   The due process clause under the United States 
Constitution protects both substantive and procedural rights.  Substantive 
due process directly limits the size of the punitive damages award when 
such is constitutionally excessive, as determined on the basis of the 
punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio.237  Procedural due process limits 
the permissible range of evidence for awarding punitive damages.238  The 
Supreme Court of the United States has provided some guidelines for 
punitive damages calculation that we will now briefly examine in order to 
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determine whether they fit with the doctrinal formulation of punitive 
damages in Mexico.  
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Supreme Court of 
the United States affirmed an award consisting of USD 200,000 in 
compensatory damages and USD 840,000 in punitive damages (a four-to-
one ratio), stating that “[w]e need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a 
mathematical bright line between the [substantive] constitutionally 
acceptable and the [substantive] constitutionally unacceptable that would 
fit every case.  We can say, however, that general concerns of 
reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried 
to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.” 239   In TXO 
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Supreme Court of the 
United States affirmed an award with a 526:1 punitive-to-compensatory 
damages ratio, stating that only “grossly excessive” awards could be struck 
down on substantive due process grounds.240  The Court concluded that the 
punitive damages awarded were not excessive in light of the large amount 
of money at stake, the defendant’s bad faith, a larger pattern of fraud and 
deceit, and the defendant’s wealth.241 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court in BMW of North America., Inc. 
v. Gore, on substantive due process grounds, reversed a lower court award 
with a 500:1 punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio.  In that case, the 
Supreme Court of Alabama had endorsed the plaintiff’s methodology of 
punitive damages calculation that was also based on a rational correlation 
between compensatory damages and the percentage of harm cases that go 
undetected.242  However, the Supreme Court of the United States found in 
that case that the USD 2 million award was grossly excessive under the 
substantive due process grounds and that lower courts should consider 
instead three elements when determining whether punitive damages awards 
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are grossly excessive: 1) the level of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct, 2) the punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio, and 3) the 
existence of comparable criminal or regulatory sanctions that would apply 
to similar acts.243  The Court also held that the award of punitive damages 
cannot punish a defendant for conduct committed in another state, as such 
would breach the procedural due process principle.244 
More interestingly, the Supreme Court of the United States in State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, also reversed on procedural due 
process grounds a USD 145 million punitive damages award, because the 
state court had allowed evidence unrelated to the defendant’s conduct in 
the particular state or with no nexus to the specific harm suffered by the 
plaintiff.245  The Supreme Court also stated, obiter dicta, that “in practice, 
few awards exceeding a single digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy (substantive) 
due process.”246  This has created a presumption that double-digit punitive-
to-compensatory ratios may infringe the substantive due process right.  
More recently, the Supreme Court of the United States in Philip Morris 
USA v. Williams (Philip Morris II)247 vacated the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Oregon in a five-to-four decision stating that punitive damages 
shall not be awarded to directly punish a defendant for harm caused to non-
parties, as such amounted to a taking of private property without 
procedural due process of law. 248   The Supreme Court explained, 
nevertheless, that a jury could calculate punitive damages awards based on 
the risk that the defendant would cause future harm to the plaintiff, but not 
to non-parties, and that a jury could also infer from the risk of harm to non-
parties that the defendant’s conduct was particularly reprehensible, but 
such non-parties harm may not be taken as the basis of the equation for 
calculation.249  
Similar limitations under the procedural due process clause in 
Mexico’s Constitution would apply to the award of punitive damages in 
Mexico.250  Non-parties’ harm could not be considered as evidence when 
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calculating the amount of any type of damages.  Moreover, with regard to 
substantive due process, the method and amount of punitive damages that 
may be awarded in Mexico become problematic in light of the doctrinal 
formulation that this type of damages have in Mexico.  The United States’ 
decisions above considered the punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio in 
the calculation of punitive damages.  But if punitive damages in Mexico 
are part of compensatory damages, how could a judge calculate them on 
the basis of other similar type of damages?  One may argue that the 
guidelines above could still be used if we fictionally consider Mexican 
punitive damages as something different than the rest of the compensatory 
damages.  Under this approach, the actual physical harm and the pecuniary 
consequences of moral damages could work as the basis for calculating 
punitive damages (see Chart No. 1 Mexico).  However, the Supreme Court 
of Mexico does not seem to have that in mind.  In the February 26, 2014 
decision, the victim’s parents were not awarded the damage of 77,798.00 
Mexican pesos claimed as actual physical harm due to lack of standing at 
the time of filing their lawsuit.  The Supreme Court of Mexico did not 
specify what share of the over 30 million Mexican pesos awarded to the 
victim as moral damages intended to redress the pecuniary consequences of 
moral damages and what percentage was aimed at restoring to the non-
pecuniary consequences of moral damages, where punitive damages now 
fall under.251  Even if the Supreme Court of Mexico had considered a 
Mexican moral (including punitive) -to-compensatory damages ratio, we 
have to assume that the result of the equation would not lead to 
overcompensation of the victim’s parents under the principle of Mexican 
law of full compensation in civil liability cases.  
Given this background, the American punitive damages are 
functionally superior to the Mexican ones regarding the function of 
punishment and deterrence.  The nature of American punitive damages, 
which matches their function, is the first parameter to calculate an amount 
of indemnity that creates better incentives to avoid grossly negligent 
conducts.  On the other hand, Mexican punitive damages will not fulfill 
their function as well as their American counterpart because their 
compensatory nature places a cap on their calculation.  From a law and 
 
Court proceedings pursuant to the basic procedural principles.”  The original text in Spanish 
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José Ramón Cossío Díaz, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at. 9. 
 
248 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
economics perspective, the impossibility of calculating their amount on the 
basis of the harm multiplied by the defendant’s chance of being found 
liable for the same wrongful activity disadvantage Mexican punitive 
damages.  As one scholar puts it, “[a]fter all, economic analysis is in 
essence a refined functional method, one that measures legal rules not by 
their doctrinal consistency but by their ability to fulfill societal needs.”252 
In addition, the absence of pre-trial discovery in Mexico may also 
cause a lower demand for punitive damages in Mexico when compared 
with the United States.  Pre-trial discovery is paramount in the gathering of 
evidence in order to meet the standard of gross misconduct in cases that 
deserve the award of punitive damages in the United States.253  In the 
United States, punitive damages will not be awarded unless there is 
evidence that the defendant acted in “willful, wanton and/or malicious 
disregard of the rights of others” under existing common law.254  This high 
judge-made standard has been adopted, though with different wording, in 
some state statutory provisions pursuant to which punitive damages will 
only be awarded “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”255  In that 
regard, plaintiffs’ attorneys need pre-trial discovery to obtain the 
production of evidence under the defendant’s control. Such evidence may 
include information about the testing of a defective product,256 internal 
memoranda concerning design changes and other recommendations for 
safety improvements, 257  the defendant’s failure to warn of potential 
dangers, and tendency to exaggerate in advertising its product’s benefits 
without also warning of risks involved, et cetera.258  Once the defendant’s 
liability has been established, the plaintiff’s lawyers may also seek the 
production of documents regarding the financial situation of the defendant 
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in order to provide the jury with evidence for the calculation of sums 
sufficient to punish and deter the defendant from similar misconduct.259 
Pre-trial discovery is unknown to Mexico’s procedural law.260  There 
are no developed rules on this issue.  In Mexico, the judge controls the 
process, and will only order the production of evidence under the control of 
the other party if such is material for the case and the requesting party 
precisely identifies the evidence concerned.261  That being said, such orders 
are rarely requested and granted, since the procedural law principle that a 
party has the obligation to prove its case (itself) is consistently applied.  
Accordingly, the lack of procedural rules in Mexico that encourage and 
facilitate the production of evidence under the control of a defendant, could 
be a serious obstacle to a victim’s capability to prove her punitive damages 
claim.  In fact, the February 26, 2014 decision by the Supreme Court of 
Mexico shows that the victim’s parents had no access to any document 
under the Hotel’s control that would corroborate a constant gross 
misbehavior.  The evidence considered regards witness statements and 
expert reports offered spontaneously by the victim’s parents or the Hotel 
after the accident happened.262  Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Mexico 
concluded that the Hotel had been negligent in its failure to maintain 
properly the artificial lake’s equipment, increasing the risk of its 
customers—not because of the request or forced production of any existing 
maintenance diaries kept by the Hotel, but because the Court seems to have 
shifted the burden of proof, mentioning that in the Answer to the 
Complaint the Hotel did not furnish any evidence to demonstrate that it 
kept the artificial lake in optimal conditions for its customers’ use.263  In 
the past, the Supreme Court of Mexico had already ruled that in the health 
industry, health professionals had the burden to prove that they acted 
diligently in performing medical services because the evidence to that 
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respect is usually under the control of such professionals, clinics or 
hospitals.264 
The absence of jury trials in Mexico could also cause a lower demand 
for punitive damages.265  In the United States, the jury plays an important 
role in tort cases.266  If the victim exercises her constitutional right under 
the Seventh Amendment, a jury, in lieu of a judge, will assess the value of 
the evidence presented by the parties during trial. The jury also decides the 
amount of compensational and punitive damages if the plaintiff prevails.  
Research illustrates that larger stakes cases tend to be routed to juries rather 
than judges for adjudication.267  There are also perceptions in the United 
States that juries are more amenable to awarding punitive damages and 
awarding higher levels of punitive damages. 268   Some of the reasons 
mentioned to explain this difference is that judges possess professional and 
reputational interests in avoiding having their damage awards adjusted on 
appeal.269  
In Mexico, the lack of juries in both civil and criminal trials will 
always leave the decision to award punitive damages in the judges’ hands.  
This difference may limit the number and sums of punitive damages 
awarded in the Mexican context and, thus, affect the deterrence function of 
punitive damages.270  In fact, the structural differences between the United 
States judicial system and Mexico’s are also a fundamental mismatch that 
may make American punitive damages “better law” than Mexican punitive 
damages.  As a country with lengthy judicial proceedings, justice in 
Mexico is less accessible than in other countries with similar economic 
characteristics.271  In Mexico, there is a grounded distrust among citizens 
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towards state courts.272  Distrust is due to the inefficiency of the system of 
criminal justice that prosecutes fewer crimes than it should,273 and also 
because of  the corruption and negligent practices that impact civil 
proceedings negatively.274  Corruption at the lower levels of justice creates 
high barriers to access to justice,275 thus, this will influence both the filing 
and awarding of punitive damages claims in Mexico. 276   As has been 
pointed out, citizens that have experienced unjust outcomes from the 
justice system may choose not to rely upon formal legal procedures for the 
solution of their justice problems.277  
Accordingly, the lack of pre-trial discovery during the taking of 
evidence phase of the proceedings and the absence of juries in Mexico’s 
legal system will also disadvantage Mexican tort victims in succeeding in 
their claims and decrease the demand for the transplanted punitive 
damages, making American punitive damages “better law” in 
accomplishing their function.  In the next section, we propose how to best 
fine-tune the incomplete and deficient incorporation punitive damages in 
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Mexico in order to achieve a successful transplant following the 
recommendations provided by Milhaupt, Pistor, and Örücü. 
6. The Necessary Fine-tuning of Mexican Punitive Damages 
Örücü suggested that the tuning of the transplanted law after 
transposition is more important to achieve a successful legal transplant than 
the source of supply or affinity of a foreign rule with the host system.278  
Adjustments to the foreign rule increase its receptivity in the host legal 
system.279  Milhaupt and Pistor also submited that the effectiveness of legal 
transplants will vary depending on how well the new rules and the host 
system adapt to each other.280  The punitive damages rule transplanted into 
the Mexican legal system has already been adjusted by the Supreme Court 
of Justice’s interpretation of punitive damage as part of moral damages.  
But such adjustment has resulted in a mismatch that will likely impair the 
proper functioning of punitive damages in Mexico when compared to the 
American ones (see Section 5.4 above).   
Milhaupt and Pistor submit that adaptation may consist of removing 
procedural obstacles to its enforcement and, in general, create the proper 
environment and incentives for applying the new law. 281   Under this 
guideline, changes in the procedural law allowing pre-trial discovery or the 
introduction of the jury-trial would be a positive change to support the 
application of the new punitive damages in Mexico.  However, Mexican 
lawyers are rather unfamiliar with the “adversarial” legal system that 
requires some degree of cooperation between the parties during discovery 
phase.  The use of juries would also involve a fundamental change in the 
structure, theory, and practice of civil justice in Mexico.  The adoption 
these institutions, a different legal transplant in itself, would clash with the 
traditional conduct of the local actors who would most likely reject them.  
We agree that for successful transposition, adjustments should not 
necessarily result in resemblance but rather in harmony.282  We cannot 
expect that punitive damages in Mexico work in the exact same manner as 
the American ones in a legal and social context that is different.  For that to 
happen, the whole civil liability law and procedure in the United States 
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would need to be imported to Mexico and not only one isolated rule.283  
Still, there is no warranty that such full transposition would make Mexican 
punitive damages exactly the same as in the United States.  Yet, the 
Mexican legal actors could perform some fine-tuning at the substantive law 
level that would make Mexican punitive damages achieve their function 
better.   
The Supreme Court of Mexico’s decision commented in this article is 
already a great step forward in this field.  Punitive damages are now part of 
the Mexican legal system and the legal actors have positive expectations 
about this new addition.  However, this decision rendered incomplete law 
in several aspects, which will need further fine-tuning.  The Supreme Court 
of Mexico did not provide any guidelines as to the calculation of punitive 
damages or the proportion that punitive damages should have in relation to 
“actual physical harm” or “moral damages with pecuniary consequences.”  
In fact, this was one of the shortcomings highlighted in the Concurrent 
Opinion issued by Justice Cossío Diaz, but yet to fill the gap. 284  It 
suggested that the Supreme Court should have looked at American 
scholarship and case law in order to provide guidelines to calculate the 
amount of punitive damages that would deter the defendant from engaging 
in similar tortious conducts. 285   However, we demonstrated above that 
using such guidelines will be problematic in light of the compensatory 
nature of punitive damages in Mexico (see Subsection 5.4 above). 
The Supreme Court of Mexico also omitted furnishing the Mexican 
legal system with other elements that are required for the optimal 
functioning of punitive damages.  For instance, the Court did not set the 
standard of conduct that would warrant the award of punitive damages.  
The commented decision states that the conduct of the tortfeasor was 
“serious,” and thus the “degree of liability was high.”286  It also stated that 
the activities of the tortfeasor had a “high social relevance.” 287  
Nonetheless, it failed to explain whether for an award of punitive damages 
a “high degree of liability” where the tortfeasor activity is of “high social 
relevance” needed to be established concurrently.  It also failed to explain 
what elements are to be established to prove a “high degree of liability.” 
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Some of the statutory provisions on punitive damages in the Unites 
States set the standard of conduct of the tortfeasor stating that no punitive 
damages are authorized unless defendant’s conduct involved at least 
“reckless disregard”288 or in wrongful death actions or when “the defendant 
consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or 
malice with regard to the plaintiff.” 289   In the United Kingdom, for 
example, punitive damages are limited to three scenarios: 1) abuses of 
power by government officials that infringe on individuals’ rights; 2) 
injuries caused by defendants who sought profits in excess of harm caused; 
and 3) express authorization by statute.290  
Similar guidelines by the Supreme Court of Mexico would have been 
welcomed by lower courts and the Mexican legal community to implement 
the institution of punitive damages in the country.  That would have given 
them a more clear and precise definition of the permissible contours of 
punitive damages and its calculation.  Instead, the Supreme Court was 
vague and relied only on unrelated ideals such as the victim’s right to 
adequate compensation291— in spite of clarifying that punitive damages are 
not compensatory in nature in the United States or elsewhere – and, as a 
second aspect, “sending a message of official disapproval for the violations 
of the human rights in question and the commitment that they will not 
happen again.”292  This last ideal, for example, contradicts the Supreme 
Court of the United States’ holding that a jury may not deter a defendant 
based on public harm when calculating the amount of an award and that the 
jury must base an award only on the circumstances specific to the case at 
bar, not on the idea relating to the fulfillment of a greater public duty.293 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Mexico has tacitly endorsed the 
award of punitive damages in contractual claims.  In principle, moral 
damages are also available in contract law cases under Mexican law.  This 
means that, in Mexico, punitive damages, as part of moral damages, may 
be awarded for such claims too.  In the United States, however, punitive 
damages cannot generally be awarded in contract disputes.294  The main 
 
 288. See e.g. Okla. Stat. tit. 23 § 9.1. 
 289. See e.g. Ala. Code 1975 § 6-11-20. 
 290. Rookes v. Barnard, supra note 77, at 410-11. 
 291. Supreme Court of Mexico, First Chamber, A.D. 30/2013, supra note 3, at. 86, n.121 
(citing Cantoral Benavides vs. Perú, supra note 61, ¶ 53). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Philip Morris II, 549 U.S. at 354-55. 
 294. See e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9.1(A). Also Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 provides in 
relevant part: “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation NOT ARISING FROM CONTRACT, 
 
2019] New Punitive Damages In Mexican Law 255 
exception is in insurance bad faith cases if the insurer’s breach of contract 
is alleged to be so egregious as to amount to a breach of the “implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” and is therefore considered to be a 
tort cause of action eligible for punitive damages.295  The Mexican legal 
actors, in particular, legislators, should further analyze the effects of 
adopting punitive damages as part of moral damages for contract claims 
and be explicit about the reasons to maintain them or reject them. 
The same would apply to the possibility of awarding punitive damages 
against the government.  Moral damages may be awarded against the 
Mexican Federal Government for torts caused by its officials.296  In this 
regard, however, the amount of moral damages may not exceed 20,000 
times the daily minimum wage in Mexico City.297  On the other hand, in 
the United States, the law explicitly precludes the availability of a punitive 
damages remedy in cases of federal government’s tort liability,298 while in 
the United Kingdom the Crown is subject to exemplary damages.299  Again, 
Mexican legal actors should consider whether the English or American 
approach is preferable for Mexico300 and determine accordingly whether 
the Mexican law on government tort liability should evolve to allow for the 
possibility of punitive damages without limiting their amount or, on the 
contrary, to exclude them altogether.  
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Finally, we know that transplanting a law means to apply effectively a 
rule developed in a different socio-economic order in a place with its own 
local conditions.301  In this regard, changes in the transplanted rules or legal 
institutions indicate that the appropriateness of these rules has been 
considered and modifications were made to take into account domestic 
legal practice and conditions of the host country.302  Adaptation does not 
necessarily require that the transplanted law be changed significantly.  
However, at the very least, an informed choice about alternative rules must 
have been made.303  Punitive damages would achieve their function better 
in Mexico if they were legislated as a specific type of damage, separate 
from other types of compensatory damages such as moral damages and 
actual physical damages.  Legislating punitive damages is the fastest and 
most effective way to obtain a better law in Mexico.  The strict rules on 
judicial precedent and the courts’ restricted task to interpret the law (see 
Section Three above) means that it would take many years before courts in 
Mexico can develop proper guidelines for the adequate implementation of 
punitive damages.  The legislative enactment of punitive damages should 
be preceded by extensive debates about the adoption of one of several 
foreign options. 304   The legislative debates may evaluate the statutory 
provisions on punitive damages from some American states or from other 
legal systems such as the Canadian province of Quebec, a civil law 
jurisdiction at least with regard to its substantive private law.  As we 
mentioned before, the familiarity with the country of origin is an indicator 
of successful transplant.  Enacting a rule modeled by the punitive damages 
provision in Sec. 3294(a) California Civil Code regarding the standard of 
misconduct required for the award of punitive damages, or Article 1621 of 
the Quebec’s Civil Code, which explicitly sets a list of criteria to be 
considered when evaluating the amount, 305  may not need major 
adaptations.  For this type of fine-tuning to take place, a strong push from 
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Mexico’s ruling elite or the legal profession will be needed.306  This can 
only be possible with the support of educational institutions, proactive 
legislators, creative scholars, and diligent judges. 
7. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court of Mexico adopted the legal institution of punitive 
damages from the American legal system.  However, Mexico’s legal 
system is currently suffering from a “transplant effect,” caused by the 
mismatches between preexisting conditions in Mexico and the transplanted 
punitive damages from the United States.  The main mismatch is a 
dogmatic one, with practical consequences.  The common law tradition 
treats punitive damages as a type of non-compensatory damages, since 
their main function is to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous misconduct 
and to deter him and the others from similar misbehavior in the future.  On 
the contrary, punitive damages in Mexico are now part of moral damages 
that are compensatory by nature.  This construction of moral damages will 
influence the method of calculating punitive damages in Mexico.  Other 
divergences at the procedural grounds, such as the lack of pre-trial 
discovery rules and jury trials in the Mexican legal system, will also 
weaken the effectiveness of punitive damages in Mexico.  
In addition, the decision by the Supreme Court of Mexico was 
insufficient in several aspects.  The current situation will reduce the 
demand for punitive damages in Mexico, which is an indicator for 
successful legal transplantations.  This means that, despite being 
comparable legal rules, punitive damages in Mexico will not accomplish 
their function as effectively as their Anglo-American forerunners.  The 
transplant of punitive damages in Mexico will not succeed unless the 
Supreme Court of Mexico receives the firm support from the federal and 
state legislatures.  Punitive damages would achieve their function better in 
Mexico if they were legislated as a specific type of damage, and separate 
from other types of compensatory damages such as moral damages and 
actual physical losses.  Mexican legal actors need a more clear and precise 
definition of the permissible contours of punitive damages and its 
calculation.  Today there are many questions regarding the tortfeasor’s 
standard of conduct and the method to calculate the award of punitive 
damages in Mexico.  Their scope is also too broad to cover contractual 
claims and government liability.  In light of the Mexican courts’ limited 
roles to only interpret the statutory law and the constitutional restriction to 
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creating new law, it would take many years before they develop proper 
guidelines for the adequate and complete transplantation of punitive 
damages.  Accordingly, the statutory enactment of punitive damages is the 
fastest and most effective way to achieve a better law in Mexico. 
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Chart Number 2 (United States) 
  
Civil Liability in the 
United States 
Tort Liability 
Type of Damages 
Punitive Compensatory 
Pain and Suffering Expenses 
Contract Liability 
Lost Wages 
 
260 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
*** 
